A small port in Yemen, an oil price above $105 and Rwanda's inflation rate may look like three separate stories. They are not.
By Habimana Abdul Karim / September 11, 2026
There is a useful way to understand geopolitics: follow the price of something ordinary.
Follow the price of fuel.
Follow the price of transport.
Follow the price of tomatoes at the market.
Suddenly, a war thousands of kilometres away stops looking like someone else's problem.
Yesterday, September 10, the Houthis captured Mocha, a port city on Yemen's Red Sea coast.
Most Rwandans have never heard of Mocha. Most could not point to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait on a map.
But what happens around that narrow piece of water can eventually show up in Kigali as a more expensive litre of fuel, a more expensive truck journey, a more expensive bag of food and a more expensive life.
At almost exactly the same moment, oil crossed $105 a barrel. but As we wrote the article, it is at $100 a barrel.
And Rwanda's inflation has just reached 15.9%.
Three numbers.
Mocha. $105. 15.9%.
They look unrelated.
They are not.
This is the part of the global economy that is easy to miss: geopolitics travels.
It travels through shipping lanes, oil tankers, insurance premiums, diesel trucks and supermarket prices.
And eventually, it arrives at your door.
THE MAP IS THE STORY
To understand what happened in Mocha.
Think of the global oil system as having doors.
One of the most important is the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow passage between Iran and Oman at the entrance to the Persian Gulf.
At its narrowest point, it is roughly 33 kilometres wide.
Yet through that narrow passage move approximately 20 to 21 million barrels of oil every day around 20% of the world's daily oil supply.
Iran sits beside it.
Since the US-Iran war began, Hormuz has been effectively closed or severely constrained.
So the world looked for another door.
That door is Bab el-Mandeb.
It sits between Yemen and Djibouti, at the southern entrance to the Red Sea.
Around 10% of global oil supply passes through it each day.
More importantly, it connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean forming part of the maritime route linking Asia and Europe through the Suez Canal.
When Hormuz became dangerous, Saudi Arabia could reroute significant oil exports through the Red Sea using Yanbu, a port on the Red Sea coast.
Saudi Arabia built pipelines for precisely this kind of contingency.
Then came Mocha.
The Houthis captured the port roughly 50 kilometres north of Bab el-Mandeb and moved toward Perim Island and Zuqar Island, positions overlooking the strait.
Suddenly, the strategic picture became much more uncomfortable.
Hormuz on one side.
Bab el-Mandeb on the other.
Pressure on both.
That is why Mocha matters.
Not because Rwanda imports oil directly from Mocha.
But because modern economies depend on routes.
And when the routes become dangerous, the price of everything moving along them changes.
THE HOUTHIS ARE NOT JUST A YEMEN STORY
The Houthis are a Yemeni armed movement that emerged from the Zaidi Shia Muslim community in northern Yemen.
They have been fighting Yemen's internationally recognised government since 2014.
Iran backs them with weapons, intelligence, training and strategic guidance.
The Houthis control much of northern Yemen, including the capital, Sanaa. The internationally recognised government controls parts of the south, including Aden.
Mocha is particularly symbolic.
It is the historic coffee port that gave the world the word “mocha.”
But its importance today has little to do with coffee.
It is geography.
And in geopolitics, geography can be more powerful than ideology.
Iran's support for the Houthis fits a broader strategy also seen in its relationships with Hezbollah in Lebanon and armed groups in Iraq: extend strategic reach without deploying Iran's own military everywhere.
The Houthis give Tehran leverage on the Red Sea.
That makes Yemen part of a much larger game.
THE GAME IS ABOUT LEVERAGE
The sequence matters.
First came Hormuz.
When the US-Iran war began, Iran's most powerful lever was the possibility of closing or threatening the Strait of Hormuz.
The reason was obvious.
If approximately 20% of global oil supply passes through the strait, threatening that flow immediately threatens the world's energy system.
Oil prices rise.
Pressure builds.
Iran gains bargaining power.
But the world adapted.
The United States responded militarily in the Gulf, while Saudi Arabia redirected significant oil exports through the Red Sea.
The Hormuz lever became less powerful as a single point of pressure.
So came the second lever.
Mocha. Bab el-Mandeb.
The Red Sea is the logical second squeeze point because the Houthis already possess the geographic position and have demonstrated that they are willing to attack shipping.
They did so in 2023 and 2024.
Major shipping companies including Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd responded by rerouting vessels around the Cape of Good Hope.
And that seemingly small decision changes everything.
Going around Africa can add roughly two weeks to a journey.
It also adds substantially to shipping costs.
A ship that takes longer to travel needs more fuel.
The crew stays at sea longer.
Insurance becomes more expensive.
The logistics chain becomes slower.
And eventually, somebody pays.
Usually, the final somebody is the consumer.
THEN CAME TRUMP'S STATEMENT
There is another layer to this story.
On September 10, President Donald Trump said the US-Iran war would continue until after the November 3 midterm elections, and that oil would remain expensive until then.
Then Mocha fell.
The timing is politically significant.
If Washington intends to force maximum concessions from Tehran before any settlement, a prolonged period of pressure makes strategic sense.
High oil prices also have domestic political consequences.
US oil producers benefit from higher prices.
The administration can continue presenting the conflict through the lens of strength against Iran.
Iran, meanwhile, needs leverage of its own.
If Hormuz alone is no longer enough, Bab el-Mandeb gives Tehran another card through its Houthi allies.
As Hisham Al-Omeisy, a senior Yemen adviser at the European Institute of Peace, put it, Iran on one side of the Arabian Peninsula and the Houthis on the other could push oil prices and the cost of goods sharply higher.
That is the strategic logic.
The battlefield is Yemen.
The commodity is oil.
The leverage is the world's dependence on chokepoints.
AND THEN THERE IS RWANDA
Now bring the map home.
Rwanda imports approximately 95% of its fuel.
It has no domestic oil production.
That means international oil prices are not an academic concern for Rwanda.
They are an imported economic shock.
When Brent crude reaches $105 a barrel, Rwanda does not suddenly become a more expensive place because someone in Kigali decided to raise prices.
The pressure comes through the supply chain.
Fuel becomes more expensive.
Transport becomes more expensive.
Goods become more expensive to move.
And consumers eventually absorb part of the increase.
This matters enormously because Rwanda is already fighting another number:
15.9%.
That is Rwanda's annual inflation rate for August 2026.
Rural inflation is even higher:
16.0%.
And rural prices increased:
3.1% in one month.
Those numbers were already worrying before Mocha.
Mocha adds another potential source of pressure.
THE TOMATO HAS A GEOPOLITICAL STORY
Here is perhaps the easiest way to understand the connection.
Approximately 80% of Rwanda's food reaches consumers through road transport.
A truck takes food from a farm to a market.
The truck uses diesel.
If diesel becomes more expensive, transporting food becomes more expensive.
The trader has higher costs.
The wholesaler has higher costs.
The retailer has higher costs.
And eventually, the consumer sees the number on the market stall change.
That is how a conflict in Yemen can become a tomato story in Rwanda.
Rwanda's August inflation was already 15.9% annually, with rural inflation at 16%.
The food component was the largest driver of July's 14.5% inflation, with fresh food rising 44.5% annually.
Now add another external oil shock.
The chain is brutally simple:
Oil → diesel → transport → food → household budget.
That is geopolitics translated into Rwanda's household economics.
RWANDA'S OTHER VULNERABILITY: THE OCEAN
There is another irony.
Rwanda is landlocked.
But being landlocked does not mean being insulated from the sea.
Quite the opposite.
Rwanda depends heavily on ports such as Mombasa and Dar es Salaam for imports.
Those ports depend on global shipping.
And global shipping has already been disrupted by the Red Sea crisis.
Ships travelling between Asia, Europe and East Africa have increasingly had to avoid the Suez route and sail around the Cape of Good Hope.
That can add approximately two weeks to journeys and 15–20% to shipping costs.
If Mocha's capture leads to greater disruption around Bab el-Mandeb, the cost of moving goods into East Africa could rise further.
And Rwanda imports a lot.
Electronics.
Textiles.
Medical supplies.
Machinery.
Industrial inputs.
Consumer goods.
This is particularly important for the manufacturing economy Rwanda is trying to build.
Manufacturers need imported machinery and inputs.
When shipping becomes more expensive, manufacturing becomes more expensive.
So an oil shock can become an industrial competitiveness problem.
EVEN Rwandair IS NOT IMMUNE
Then there is aviation.
Jet fuel follows crude oil.
When Brent is around $105 rather than $75 or $80, aviation becomes more expensive.
Airlines have two choices.
Absorb the cost.
Or pass it to passengers.
Either way, something changes.
That matters for Rwanda's tourism ambitions and for Bugesera Airport, which is still under construction and in which Qatar Airways holds a 60% stake.
An airport is not just concrete and runways.
It is an economic ecosystem built around airlines, passengers, tourism and logistics.
And all of those depend, directly or indirectly, on energy prices.
HISTORY HAS SEEN THIS MOVIE BEFORE
None of this is unprecedented.
In 1967, the Suez Canal was closed following the Six-Day War.
Ships were forced around the Cape of Good Hope for years.
Countries far from the Middle East paid more for imported goods.
Then came 1973–74.
Arab oil-producing countries imposed an oil embargo.
Global oil prices quadrupled in one year.
Countries that had played no role in the conflict nevertheless paid the bill through higher energy costs and economic disruption.
Then came 2023–24.
The Houthis attacked ships in the Red Sea.
Shipping companies rerouted.
Costs increased.
Import-dependent countries felt the consequences.
The lesson is remarkably consistent:
A chokepoint does not need to be completely closed to become expensive.
Sometimes the possibility of disruption is enough.
Ships reroute.
Insurance rises.
Journeys lengthen.
Prices move.
And countries far away pay.
For Rwanda, the exposure is especially significant.
It is landlocked, oil-importing and heavily dependent on imported goods.
That is not pessimism.
It is geography.
WHAT RWANDA CAN CONTROL
There is little point pretending Rwanda can influence the US-Iran war.
It cannot close Bab el-Mandeb.
It cannot change President Trump's electoral calculations.
It cannot control Iranian strategy.
And it cannot decide what happens inside Yemen.
But small countries are not powerless.
They simply need to become more resilient.
The first answer is domestic energy.
Rwanda already produces electricity from hydropower, methane gas and solar.
The more households, businesses and institutions can substitute domestic electricity for imported fuel, the less exposed they become to international oil shocks.
Rural electrification matters here.
The programme currently reaches 54% of households.
Every additional household that can rely on electricity rather than charcoal or fuel-based energy is slightly less exposed to global oil volatility.
The second answer is food production and processing.
If Rwanda produces food domestically, processes more of it locally and shortens the distance between producer and consumer, it reduces exposure to international transport and fuel costs.
Beans into flour.
Milk into powder.
Cassava into starch.
These are not merely industrial projects.
They are forms of economic insurance.
THE REAL LESSON OF MOCHA
The most important lesson from Mocha is not that Rwanda should panic.
It is that Rwanda should understand its vulnerability.
A country can have disciplined institutions, good roads, ambitious development plans and strong economic management and still be vulnerable to an event in a place most of its citizens cannot find on a map.
That is the nature of the modern economy.
The world is connected through things that are almost invisible until they break.
A shipping lane.
A pipeline.
A refinery.
A port.
A strait 33 kilometres wide.
A barrel of oil.
And suddenly the chain reaches Rwanda.
So remember the three numbers:
$105
The price of oil.
15.9%
Rwanda's inflation.
16%
Rural inflation.
And remember the number underneath them:
3.1%
The increase in rural prices in just one month.
Those numbers tell us something larger than the latest headline.
They tell us that Rwanda's economic security is not determined only in Kigali.
It is also determined in the Gulf.
In the Red Sea.
At Bab el-Mandeb.
At Mombasa.
At Dar es Salaam.
And, ultimately, in the decisions of households trying to make one salary stretch to the end of the month.
The Houthis captured Mocha.
Oil crossed $105.
Rwanda recorded 15.9% inflation.
These are not three stories.
They are one story; A story of how geopolitics becomes economics, and how economics eventually becomes personal.
Rwanda cannot control the game.
But it can learn to play the part of the game it can control.
Produce more at home.
Shorten supply chains.
And teach households to understand the forces moving around them.
Because there will be another Mocha.
There will be another chokepoint.
There will be another oil shock.
The countries that suffer most will not necessarily be the countries with the fewest resources.
They will be the countries that understand their vulnerabilities too late.
For Rwanda, the real strategic question is therefore not:
“What happens next in Yemen?”
It is:
“What have we built at home so that what happens in Yemen does not decide what happens at home?”
That is the economic lesson worth remembering.
The map is global.
The bill is local.
Any inquiries or comments about our articles; suggestions to next Economic related topics email us: [email protected]
Sources
Reuters — Houthis advance along Yemen coast, threaten Saudi oil exports, September 10, 2026.
Reuters — Iranian arms and advice helped Yemen’s Houthis seize key Red Sea city, September 10, 2026.
NISR — Consumer Price Index (CPI), August 2026.
African Development Bank (AfDB) — Rwanda Economic Outlook 2026.
The National — Oil Prices Hit $105 Per Barrel as Houthis Seize Key Red Sea Port, September 10, 2026.
CNN — Iran-backed Rebels Capture Red Sea Port, Tightening Grip on Key Global Chokepoint, September 10, 2026.
Al Jazeera — What Do Houthi Attacks Mean for Oil Prices?, December 2023.
World Bank — Rwanda external-reserves and import-cover data.