The ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh and the events leading up to it have become subjects of political manipulation in Armenia. In an effort to evade responsibility, the Armenian authorities have claimed that the leadership of Nagorno-Karabakh refused to engage in direct negotiations with Baku, thereby enabling Azerbaijan’s military operation. This narrative has been echoed in recent statements by both the Prime Minister of Armenia and various members of the ruling party. However, the reality is far more complex.
The idea of direct negotiations between Baku and Stepanakert was first introduced after the escalation in September 2022. At that time, Azerbaijan launched its largest military offensive since the 2020 Second Karabakh War, seizing parts of Armenia’s sovereign territory and forcing Yerevan into political concessions. Against this backdrop, a meeting took place in Washington between Armenia’s National Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan and Hikmet Hajiyev, foreign policy advisor to Azerbaijan’s president. The meeting was mediated by U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan. It was during this meeting that the proposal for direct talks between Baku and Stepanakert was discussed, with the stated aim of addressing the security and rights of Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenian population.
For Armenia, which was under increasing pressure to recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan, these negotiations were seen as a face-saving mechanism. However, Azerbaijan categorically rejected any meetings involving international mediation. Despite Armenia’s significant concessions, Baku’s position remained unchanged.
However, by early 2023, with Nagorno-Karabakh already under blockade by Azerbaijan, U.S. officials established direct contact with its leadership and began working on organizing a meeting in a third country. The European Union was also involved to some extent in this process. Negotiations over the location and format of the meeting lasted for months, and a preliminary agreement was reached to hold a secret meeting in Sofia between representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan.
However, as the meeting approached, Russia launched a disinformation campaign. On June 15, the Russian state news agency RIA Novosti published an article claiming that Washington was pressuring Nagorno-Karabakh’s leadership to meet with Azerbaijan in a third country, allegedly under the threat of an Azerbaijani “anti-terror operation” if they refused. The article also framed Nagorno-Karabakh’s Foreign Minister, Sergey Ghazaryan, as advancing an Azerbaijani agenda—an obviously paradoxical claim, given that the Armenian side was the primary proponent of such talks. Notably, Russian officials had been aware of these negotiations from the outset.
Shortly after the RIA Novosti article, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova weighed in, stating:
"For the first time in modern history, I am seeing reports of a country that claims to be a mediator using force and threats to compel a negotiating party to participate in a settlement process. In other words, they are using coercion, threats, and blackmail to force someone to sit at the negotiating table or attend forums designed by the mediators themselves."
Following this Russian intervention, the planned Sofia meeting was derailed. Around the same time, Azerbaijan tightened its blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh, completely cutting off humanitarian supplies.
Despite this setback, efforts to arrange a meeting in a third country continued. A new meeting was planned in Bratislava, and the Nagorno-Karabakh delegation had even purchased airline tickets. However, Azerbaijan exploited tensions between Washington and Moscow to sabotage this meeting as well. Most likely, Baku informed Moscow of the planned Bratislava meeting and, in return, secured Russian support for an alternative meeting in Yevlakh, under Azerbaijani terms. This Russian-Azerbaijani understanding ultimately led to the failure of the Bratislava meeting as well.
It is also noteworthy that, during this period, two meetings took place involving the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs and EU Special Representative Toivo Klaar. These discussions focused on the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh. The second meeting was held in Istanbul just days before Azerbaijan’s military operation on September 19. The fact that such meetings took place at all was significant given the broader Russia-West confrontation.
In conclusion, the Armenian government's claims that talks with Baku did not take place due to Nagorno-Karabakh’s refusal do not reflect reality. Furthermore, while Russia took no real steps to pressure Azerbaijan, it actively obstructed other mediation efforts, seeing them as a threat to its own influence.
I plan to write a more detailed article on these events in the future, providing additional data and insights.
Tigran Grigoryan