Azatutyun (RFE/RL): We’re speaking with political analyst Tigran Grigoryan. Hello, Mr. Grigoryan, thank you foraccepting our invitation.
Tigran Grigoryan: Thank you as well.
So, the Russian ambassador visited the nuclear power plant yesterday and stated that they can offer various projects for a new energy unit for Armenia—both high-capacity and low-capacity ones. He reminded that Armenia and Russia share common standards on this matter. How would you explain this renewed activity, especially considering that last year, there was active talk about Armenia-U.S. cooperation in this area?
Overall, I think this reflects Russia’s recent approach, where it seems that Moscow has realized Armenia has set a strategic goal to diversify its relations in the energy, economic, and other sectors. Recently, we’ve seen several Russian experts visiting Yerevan and delivering similar messages. One of the analytical centers involved in Russian foreign policy even published a report along these lines. Russia views this diversification process as a threat. Ambassador Kopirkin even said this explicitly a few weeks ago in an interview, claiming that this diversification effort is being used by various Western actors to sever the allied relationship between Armenia and Russia. So, it seems that at this stage, they’ve decided to take some proactive steps.
As for nuclear energy, I’m of course not an energy specialist, so I can't assess which option is better for Armenia from a technical standpoint. But it’s quite clear that the Armenian authorities have made a political decision to seek alternatives to the Russian option. It’s no secret that in recent months—especially during the final months of the Biden administration—there were active discussions with the American side about cooperation in this realm. As you know, there is a clause in the strategic cooperation document signed with the U.S. that refers to this, and during that period, they were also planning to work on the 123 agreements that would have allowed Armenia to utilize American technology.
Now, under the new U.S. administration, the answers to these questions are still unclear, although in theory, this could be one of the areas that might also interest the Trump administration, which may want to advance this agenda.
That’s exactly the question I wanted to ask. There were quite optimistic statements about potential Armenia-U.S. cooperation last year, and even at the beginning of this year, during the signing of that agreement, it was mentioned that negotiations would begin on cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. But after that, the topic seems to have either been put on hold or has stopped being discussed. In your opinion, what’s the reason?
It's hard to say whether it’s actually been frozen at this stage. It seems that the United States is still focused on other issues, and when it comes to relations with Armenia, we mostly see statements—for example, from the State Department or other officials—but no concrete steps from the new administration so far. If during the last two years of the Biden administration, the ties had become quite intensive, with almost weekly American delegations visiting Armenia, we’re not seeing that kind of developments now.
And more generally, even if we set aside this nuclear topic, when we look at broader Armenia-U.S. relations or U.S. involvement in the South Caucasus, it’s still unclear what the level of engagement will be under the new administration or what its priorities will be. You may have seen that a few days ago, a Trump envoy stated that Armenia and Azerbaijan could potentially become part of the Abraham Accords. So, everything is still at the discussion stage, and it’s difficult to say anything specific. But as I already mentioned, I think this nuclear topic is one of those potential issues that could interest the Trump administration, which tends to focus more on practical, transactional matters rather than value-based ones.
Could the issue of a new nuclear plant eventually become an indicator of Armenia’s geopolitical orientation—perhaps next year, especially since the timelines mentioned also point in that direction?
Well, I think it’s a very important part of the declared diversification process. It’s no secret that Armenia’s energy dependence on Russia is quite significant. If we also take into account developments over the past year—for example, the Brussels meeting, whose goal appeared to be ensuring that Armenia does its homework in terms of reducing energy and economic dependence on Russia—then yes, if the Armenian authorities decide that the new nuclear plant will not be a Russian one, meaning they find an alternative to the Russian option, this would be a very important step in that process.
And this is also why the Russians are so concerned and active in this matter—but not only in this matter. Similar activity is being observed on economic issues as well, such as issues related to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), where the message again is that leaving the EAEU, for example, would be disastrous for Armenia.
Thank you very much for the conversation. Let me remind our viewers that we were speaking with political analyst Tigran Grigoryan.