'The Way Of The Wind'
by Algernon Charles Swinburne (1837 – 1909)
The wind's way in the deep sky's hollow
None may measure, as none can say
How the heart in her shows the swallow
The wind's way.
Hope nor fear can avail to stay
Waves that whiten on wrecks that wallow,
Times and seasons that wane and slay.
Life and love, till the strong night swallow
Thought and hope and the red last ray,
Swim the waters of years that follow
The wind's way.
'A Gust of Wind', (Judith Gautier), 1886/87, John Singer Sargent
Justin Heinrich Knecht, (1752 – 1817), 'Le portrait musical de la nature:
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, (1770 - 1831). 'The Philosophy of Nature'.
'It can perhaps be said that philosophy, in our time, enjoys no particular favour or affection; it is at least no longer recognized as the foundation which must constitute the indispensable introduction to all further scientific and vocational education. It may certainly be accepted as indisputably true however, that the philosophy of nature in particular is suffering from a very considerable lack of favour. I shall not concern myself very fully with the extent to which this particular prejudice is justified, although I cannot of course entirely overlook this question. Intense stimulation has had the effect that one might have expected, and looking at the way in which the Idea of the philosophy of nature has exhibited itself in recent times, one might say that in the first gratification which its discovery has afforded, it has been grasped by fumbling hands instead of being wooed by active reason, and that it is by its suitors rather than by its detractors that it has been done to death. For the most part it has been variously transformed into an external formalism, and perverted into a notionless instrument for superftciality of thought and unbridled powers of imagination. The details of the extravaganzas into which death-struck forms of the Idea have been perverted do not concern me here. Some years ago I expressed myself more fully on this subject in the preface to 'The Phenomenology of Spirit'. It need cause no surprise that the more thoughtful view of nature, in which perception has been guided by the Idea, as well as the crass empiricism of the external abstract understanding, should have shunned such a procedure, which is as grotesque as it is pretentious. Crude empiricism and travestied thought-forms, capriciousness of fancy and the flattest methods of proceeding according to superficial analogy, have been mixed into a complete chaos, and this stew has been served up as the Idea, reason, science, divine perception. A complete lack of system and scientific method has been hailed as the very peak of scientific accomplishment. It is charlatanry such as this, and Schelling's philosophy is a prime example of it, that has brought the philosophy of nature into disrepute'.
'To reject the philosophy of nature outright because of such bungling and misrepresentation of the Idea, is quite another matter however. Those possessed by a hatred of philosophy have often welcomed its misuse and perversion, which they have used in order to bring the science itself into discredit, and out of their established rejection of what is bogus, to fabricate nebulous evidence of their having called philosophy itself in question'.
- 'The Philosophy of Nature'
So what is the difference between Hegel's philosophy of nature and that of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph the 'charlatan' Schelling, (1775 – 1854), for they are indeed quite different.
Hegel's purpose in his philosophy of Nature is to give a precise theoretical account of the natural world and its phenomena. He divides the natural world into three stages, mechanics, physics and the organic world and these three stages are grounded upon our own sense of knowledge of Nature and through thought are transformed into something universal. The first stage is the mechanical stage made up of singular beings, like an over arching unity, and Hegel identifies three phenomena that make up this realm, space, time and matter and motion. The first stage of Nature can be grasped only as finite mechanics, the second stage is the physical stage of Nature and since the first stage lacked any coherent structure the physical sphere will deal with physical beings that are divided yet maintain a specific structure albeit the structure will always be imperfect because they are conceived through their parts.
Hegel gives an example of a crystal, although a crystal has material parts and can be organised in a body it still seems that each part could be split off creating another body, and lacking unity the physical sphere of Nature still lacks an integrated whole. There are two ways to understand the natural progression, the first corresponds to stages one and two and this stage is called the material as material Nature lacks an integration with structure and the laws of diversity while the conceptual phase is understood as the third stage, the organic, and explains the expansion of Nature's unity, wholeness and structure.
'The common understanding of cohesion merely refers to the individual moment of quantitative strength of the connection between the parts of a body. Concrete cohesion is the immanent form and determinacy of this connection, and comprehends both external crystallisations and the fragmentary shapes or central shapes, crystallisation which displays itself inwardly in transparent movement'.
...
'Through external crystallisation the individual body is sealed off as an individual against others, and capable of a mechanical process with them. As an inwardly formed entity the body specifies this process in terms of its behaviour as a merely general mass. In terms of its elasticity, hardness, softness, viscosity, and abilities to extend or to burst, the body retains its individual determinacy in resistance to external force'.
...
'The crystal is built up of layers, but its fracture cuts across all layers. The inner determination of form is no longer merely the determination of cohesion, but all the parts belong to this form; matter is thoroughly crystallized. The crystal is likewise bounded externally, and regularly enclosed in an internally differentiated unity. Its planes are completely smooth and mirrorlike, and have edges and angles forming shapes ranging from simple regular equilateral prisms etc. to those which are outwardly irregular, though a law is traceable even in these. There are of course fine-grained earthy crystals, the shape of which is predominantly superficial; as punctiformity, the precise nature of earth is the shape of shapelessness. When pure crystals such as Iceland spar are struck so that they are free to fracture in accordance with their inner form however, they reveal in the smallest of their particles their previously quite indiscernible shape'.
- 'The Philosophy of Nature'
We know that it is time ('Time with the Midas touch...') which is responsible for the transformation. The recent discovery of anti-matter in the universe inevitably involves the conception of anti-time as the fourth side of this negatively charged continuum. Where anti-particle and particle collide they not only destroy their own physical identities, but their opposing time-values eliminate each other, subtracting from the universe another quantum from its total store of time. It is random discharges of this type, set off by the creation of anti-galaxies in space, which have led to the depletion of the time-store available to the materials of our own solar system.
Just as a super-saturated solution will discharge itself into a crystalline mass, so the super-saturation of matter in our continuum leads to its appearance in a parallel spatial matrix. As more and more time 'leaks' away, the process of super-saturation continues, the original atoms and molecules producing spatial replicas of themselves, substance without mass, in an attempt to increase the foot-hold upon existence. The process is theoretically without end, and it may be possible eventually for a single atom to produce an infinite number of duplicates of itself and so fill the entire universe, from which simultaneously all time has expired, an ultimate macrocosmic zero beyond the wildest dreams of Plato and Democritus.
The beauty of the spectacle had turned the keys of memory, and a thousand images of childhood, forgotten for nearly forty years, filled his mind, recalling the paradisal world when everything seemed illuminated by that prismatic light…
…this illuminated forest in some way reflects an earlier period of our lives, perhaps an archaic memory we are born with of some ancestral paradise where the unity of time and space is the signature of every leaf and flower....
...the response to light is a response to all the possibilities of life itself.
- J. G. Ballard, (1930 – 2009, 'The Crystal World'
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In contrast to Hegel, Schelling adds more importance to the subject who becomes the main object of the discussion of the philosophy of Nature, according to Jason M. Wirth, so Schelling begins his first outline for a system of a philosophy of Nature by mapping out the process by which Nature becomes absolute subject and likewise the process by which the cosmos unfolds outside of itself so Schelling's main purpose is to show how Nature arises out of the unconditioned and this unconditioned is understood as the absolute Spirit which becomes the first principle of the philosophy of Nature thus the unconditioned is the principle of Nature's highest activity, one might say that this highest principle is Being itself because of course it creates in Nature all of its possible productions and these possible productions are the creative productions and constructions of the absolute activity of Nature and each product of Nature bears that infinite mark within itself and shares the tendency towards infinite becoming so according to Schelling the absolute in Nature is characterised by an infinite process of becoming and striving.
To maintain this absolute as a whole absolute Spirit must unfold itself through Nature and this process of unfolding allows the absolute to objectify itself in order to construct Nature through a series of potencies. Schelling maintains that there are three fundamental potencies of Nature and these potencies are the dynamic stages that become more complex as each are assembled together and the potencies are created out of an original duality that Schelling refers to as a priori thus in order for absolute activity to produce there has to be a series of fundamental inhibitions that tease out each new product hence in order to illustrate this tension of inhibition Schelling gives an example of a running stream hitting rocks and while the force of the rocks causes little pockets of the stream to cause tiny whirlpools this is an instance of that tension that moment of inhibition these whirlpools create resistance and the result of this resistance is to create a repulsive force that repels the movement of becoming. And as it repels and resists matter is formed through this creative tension and thus the first potency is born.
The second potency deals with the aftermath of this constant cycle of attraction and repulsion the infinite activity of Nature rings these inhibitions together to form this dynamic process thus the dynamic process as the second potency is the creation of gravity, light, and chemistry. So the third and final potency is the emergence of organic life. The infinite is always found in the finite form says Schelling and yet each product is like a tiny expression of the infinite. Schelling speaks of these active expressions as actons and in a Liebnizian sense (Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646 – 1716)), we can call them dynamic monads or perhaps rogue monads, so the highest production of nature is human subjectivity for through the subject the absolute becomes conscious of itself the human becomes the ultimate instrument for nature to become self-conscious.
'Von der Weltseele'. 'On the world soul'. Released by Schelling in 1798 in which he begins by articulating his vision of nature as a universal organism ... when one philosophises about Nature one should be concerned that one's text consists of no artificial principles this is to grasp the fullness and organic totality of Nature and this implies that the philosopher cannot impart an abstract theory that forces a false unity upon Nature. Schelling's true desire in returning to a philosophy of Nature is to reveal the inner dynamics that are activated in the constant motions and forces and only studying this activity will get us the philosophers closer to an understanding in order to find the traces of Nature's concealed freedom as Schelling puts it, so he wants to highlight a bigger picture of the whole and that this whole of Nature must include its constant flux and metamorphosis. This picture of the whole that Schelling is aiming for should not only synthesise our imminent immediate encounters with Nature but also unify our insights with natural science.
A key point. Christopher Lauer claims that 'On the World Soul' contains parts on both organic and inorganic Nature and Schelling's main organising principle holds that both reflect the same unifying tendencies in Nature so Schelling's ultimate pursuit is one that must seek to disclose Nature's true forces. However the question remains as to what exactly such a philosophical endeavour should consist of. It should perhaps consist of a theory that does not make the whole of Nature conform to the human understanding a la Immanuel Kant, (1724 - 1804), simply to appease empirical reality. Schelling once again invokes concepts that are limited to human beings but still allow human insight to tap into Nature's intensive forces and so Schelling is endeavouring to be objective while working with these limiting concepts but the space of philosophising has to preserve Nature's autonomous freedom so Nature's true infinity with all of its free and wondrous possible forces can e opened up to the philosopher as an infinite free play of space in which dynamic philosophy can explain all of Nature's phenomena that is from the reciprocal activity of various materials. So Schelling's approach to the dynamic activities of Nature follows thus: all of these dynamic forces can be interpreted as one universal and necessary development so Schelling is committed to expressing how reason is imbued in all of Nature thus he sees an inner drive to Nature a kind of formal determination and a will that desires to produce variations of itself, for instance life, endlessly always producing, so this will to produce, this unravelled in the Absolute that unfolds in a series of becomings, in all shapes and sizes of life, in all forms degrees and potencies, remain in a state of becoming until life has reached a state of dynamic equilibrium.
Schelling is apt to explain an original duplicity that exists in Nature, there exists both a positive and a negative force that maintains the subsistence of Nature these two forces are explained by the relationship of light and gravity or gravity and light, his example which he then uses in his freedom essay. 'Gravity', he says in 'On the World Soul', 'is Nature's insistence on a continual self-preservation and self-presence, on pulling back from expansion and so it is opposed to the light's essence which struggles against identity to spread itself through the whole of Nature. Gravity works externally on things pulling them towards a longed for presence while the light essence begins from the all present centre and thrusts outwards'. This essay captivated Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, (1749 – 1832), and Johann Christoph Friedrich von Schiller, (1759 – 1805), who knew they had to have Schelling in their inner circle.
Within 'On the Wold Soul' Schelling initially sets out to explain the universal force that is manifested in all change in life and moving forward from this initial groundwork Schelling then endeavours to such for the positive principle that maintains all the organization of matter and life. Joan Steigerwald explains that Schelling's world soul concept is not toe thought of as some hyper-physical spirit that is the cause of the natural world's organisation but rather Schelling's intent is to articulate the interconnected play of forces that are in constant opposition to one another which constitute the animating life forces of the cosmos itself. So while one such force expands the other contracts and is inhibited thereby leading to the medium of the world being balanced out by this dynamic activity. This constant push and pull of forces is the primary focal point in Schelling's systematic analysis of how the natural world is both developed and how it emerges as a living whole he is keen to explain the relationship between organic and inorganic by a common bond a common principle das Band that holds oth together in a balanced state between dynamism and mechanism we cannot have an organised model of Nature without mechanism being restricted, as it is restricted the universal organism is transformed into a dynamic becoming. We could not have dynamism without mechanism and the same applies for the positive and negative Nature where the positive would not arise without the negative, Steigerwald states that this dynamic process in a sense narrates the history of the natural world both organic and inorganic. On the world's soul Schelling opens with an interaction on light and gravity and as if picking a scene from an origin story light is both positive expansive streaming from the Sun as it spreads into innumerable materials of our world the Earth reacts with an opposing power and negative attraction pushing back on the expansive power and thus our world lies in this reciprocal interaction of the two.
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I can see Hegel's point. Ok, let's press on with his philosophy of nature instead.
What is the the metaphysical and ethical status of nature? What contribution can the philosophy of Nature make to such a question, in the light of what we have just heard from Schelling. The possibility of a specifically philosophical approach to Nature is certainly not narrowly historical but is on the contrary centrally relevant to environmental concerns for insofar as environmental degradation stems from technological developments that ultimately derive from modern science perhaps science embodies a problematic approach to the natural world and with Hegel we can identify a determinate problem with the scientific approach given that the latter rests upon inadequate metaphysical assumptions and Hegel thought that there can be a form of specifically philosophical inquiry into Nature grounded upon different and more adequate metaphysical assumptions with the additional implication that this specially philosophical form of inquiry into Nature could provide the basis for a more environmentally sustainable way of life.
And so Hegel’s philosophy of Nature could speaks to important social and philosophical problems which is maybe a minority view for since its initial publication in outline form in 1817 it has dismissed, rejected, even scorned and mocked y philosophers. The philosophy of nature was 'ignored for the most part in his own time', Terry Pinkard, (1947 - ), informs us, '[and] it fell into complete disrepute immediately after his death and has rarely been looked at since by anybody other than dedicated Hegel scholars'. The majority of Hegel scholars have been distinctly unsympathetic toward his philosophy of Nature, Alexandre Kojève, (1902 - 1968), castigating Hegel’s 'absurd philosophy of Nature, his insensate critique of Newton, and his own ‘magical’ physics which discredited his system'. The prolem apparently stems from a perception of the work as presenting a speculative, a priori, theory of the natural world in competition with standard scientific accounts and this presupposes an exaggerated assessment of the powers of pure a priori reasoning and is in actuality capable of generating only a tissue of fantastic imaginings about Nature, as Hegel was inevitably left with. Hegel does of course use a priori reasoning to construct his basic theory of Nature albeit he incorporates large quantities of material from contemporary science but he does so only when he can interpret scientific claims as corresponding to his basic a priori theory, a method of reinterpreting scientific claims in light of a basic a priori theory that Alison Stone calls strong a priorism contending as she does that Hegel’s approach to nature is a priori in a strong sense in spite of the long-standing hostility to speculative philosophizing about Nature but Hegel’s strong a priorism is viable insofar as it rests upon his metaphysics of nature a metaphysics that is of interest precisely because it challenges the metaphysics presupposed in science and so too the degradation of nature which arguably issues from that scientific metaphysics.
Stone argues that in reinterpreting scientific claims in terms of his basic a priori theory Hegel is re-describing such claims in terms of the particular metaphysical conception of Nature that informs his a priori theory and so he believes that all scientific theorizing embodies certain metaphysical assumptions about Nature assumptions which he rejects constructing his alternative theory on the basis of contrasting metaphysical assumptions and or Hegel the central assumption underlying science is that natural forms are bare things which is to say natural forms lack rationality agency and intrinsic meaning and by contrast his own metaphysical view is that natural forms are in a certain qualified sense rational agents that act and transform themselves in accordance with rational requirements but although natural forms are not conscious they manifest a specifically non-conscious frozen rationality.
His metaphysics of Nature is therefore more adequate than that presupposed within science a view for which two main arguments he forwards. First, his rationalist view of nature (that is, all natural forms act rationally or all natural forms are intrinsically rational, not an endorsement of the Enlightenment view of reason nor of a metaphysics in a pre-Kantian which is to say Liebnizian or Spinozist sense) is closer to the basic way in which we experience Nature. Second, his rationalist view allows us to recognize that all natural forms are intrinsically good in virtue of the practical effectivity of their inherent rationality thereby establishing the necessity for a philosophical re-conceptualization and study of Nature distinct from its scientific study although such a philosophical mode of study would not be anti-scientific or obscurantist but rather instead re-describing and incorporating scientific claims wherever possible.
And so, as I have said before, if you have a noble and worthy cause which requires significant changes to our way of life instead of expecting people just to see its nobility and worthiness and appealing to feelings what is required is a grounding of your cause upon solid philosophical foundations, and with my series of articles The Struggle for Recognition - On Animal Rights parts one to ten I looked into the philosophical arguments for and against animal rights, demonstrating the flaws in the latter, and in the former too if they were bad arguments, because of course bad arguments serve the case for animal rights badly making the case seem much weaker than it is even ridiculous it just would have been better just to stick with an appeal to feelings. And I eventually grounded the cause for animal rights (and vegetarianism) upon sound philosophical arguments drawn from Hegel and that are difficult to contest. Now I will do the same thing for the cause of environmentalism, climate change and so on, so there will be no need for Just Stop Oil or whatever environmental group is doing what to be blocking roads or throwing soup at paintings and I hope the likes of Greta Thunberg, (2003 - ), and eco-warriors everywhere will appreciate what I have done for them. Lady Philosophy will save the world.
'A Gust of Wind', Francesco Vinea (1845 - 1902)
'Bearing in mind the present prejudices and the widespread misunderstandings of the philosophy of nature, it might seem appropriate to begin by evincing the true Notion of this science. The initial opposition we encounter is to be regarded as accidental and superficial however, and all that it entails may be left on one side without more ado. Dealing with it would tend to involve polemics, and would not be gratifying. What might be learnt is partly subsumed under the science itself, and would not be so instructive as to justify reducing still further the already limited space available for the wealth of material to be dealt with in an encyclopaedia. We shall therefore content ourselves with what has already been said; it can serve as a kind of protest against this manner of thinking, and as an assurance that such philosophizing about nature, which often glitters and entertains, which will always thrill and astonish, and which may well satisfy those daring enough to follow the brilliance of a flare dropped into the philosophy of nature if it obviates the need for thought, is not to be expected from this presentation. What we are engaged on here is not a matter of imagination and phantasy; it is the matter of the Notion, and of reason'.
- 'The Philosophy of Nature'
The thorny question of a priorism raises its head for can one legitimately propounding a speculative, a priori, theory of Nature that can only be a matter of imagination and phantasy despite Hegel's protestations to the contrary? To what extent, and in what sense, does Hegel employs a priori reasoning to theorize Nature? In the introduction to the 'Philosophy of Nature' he presents us with some clues for an interpretation of his method though we must look at remarks upon method in other parts of the text also. that one cannot hope to derive an interpretation of his method on its basis alone. The claim is repeatedly made that the method involves some kind of reconciliation between a priori and empirical approaches to Nature albeit three seemingly disparate forms of reconciliation are proffered. First one must proceed by first accepting a selection of contemporary scientific accounts of natural phenomena on empirical grounds and thence reconstructing such accounts in a priori form. Second one must develop one's basic theory of nature through unaided a priori reasoning thereupon incorporating such scientific results as may be interpreted as corroborating the theory. Third, one must constitute one's account of Nature employing such scientific claims that could be interpreted as instantiating logical categories.
Which to go for? I would go for number three but as Hegel reminds us elsewhere one bare assurance is worth just as much as another and so I will need to prove my case.
'For, when confronted with a knowledge that is without truth, Science can neither merely reject it as an ordinary way of looking at things, while assuring us that its Science is a quite different sort of cognition for which that ordinary know1edge is of no account whatever; nor can it appeal to the vulgar view for the intimations it gives us of something better to come. By the former assurance, Science would be declaring its power to lie simply in its being; but the untrue knowledge likewise appeals to the fact that it is, and assures us that for it Science is of no account. One bare assurance is worth just as much as another. Still less can Science appeal to whatever intimations of something better it may detect in the cognition that is without truth, to the signs which point in the direction of Science. For one thing, it would only be appealing again to what merely is; and for another, it would only be appealing to itself, and to itself in the mode in which it exists in the cognition that is without truth. In other words, it would be appealing to an inferior form of its being, to the way it appears, rather than to what it is in and for itself'.
- 'Phenomenology of Spirit'
In the 'Introduction' Hegel stresses that his method of theorizing Nature is not that of natural science (Naturwissenschaft) which he understands to possess three defining characteristics, first, natural science is a form of the study of Nature and this does not as such distinguish it from the philosophical study of Nature, second, natural science is a systematic form of enquiry into Nature it attempts to integrate its discoveries and hypotheses into a comprehensive and unified understanding of the natural world and here once more natural science is no different from philosophy of Nature with regard to its systematicity, and third, Hegel regards natural science as a specifically empirical form of the study of Nature and this does separate it from the philosophy of Nature. Hegel regards his own philosophy as scientific (wissenschaftlich) in that it provides a systematically organized body of knowledge and he designates his work the system of science (System der Wissenscaft) but it is not scientific in the sense of being empirical.
Hegel’s usual term for natural science is physics (Physik), meaning not the specialized discipline but natural science in all its branches and he often refers to physics as empirical physics (empirische Physik) for natural science or physics is empirical in that it begins with the observation of nature in perception and experience.
'It is usually said that logic deals only with forms and that their content must be taken from elsewhere. It is not logical thoughts, however, that are 'only' so-and-so, in comparison with all other content; on the contrary, it is all other content that is an 'only' in comparison with them. Logical thoughts are the ground that is in and for itself of everything.- Concern with such pure determinations does, to be sure, presuppose a superior level of education. Studying them in and for themselves signifies further that we deduce them from thinking itself, and see from their own [development] whether they are genuine. We do not take them up in an external way, and then define them or exhibit their value and validity by comparing them with how they actually occur in consciousness. If we did that we would be starting from observation and experience. We would say, for example, 'We normally use 'force' in such and such a way'. We call a definition of that sort correct if it agrees with what is found to be the case with its ob-ject in our ordinary consciousness of it. In this way, however, a concept is not determined in and for itself but according to a presupposition, which then becomes the criterion, the standard of correctness. We do not have to use such a standard, however; we can simply let the inherently living determinations take their own course instead'.
- 'The Encyclopaedia Logic'
______________________
Who created me?
Who created me?
Who created from the bottom, to the top,
To the inside-out of me...?
Even from the start,
When you took my heart,
You told me from the top to the bottom,
Outside-in, I fell apart...
Who created me?
I am not afraid!
I accepted you from top to bottom,
Outside-in, I am what you made!
But who created me?
Who created me? Oh!
Who created me...?!
Who created light
To keep me safe at night?
It didn't matter who was top or bottom,
Outside-in, it all felt right...
But far away they took you;
I don't know where to look for you.
I searched the country from the top to the bottom,
In and out of every nook!
I followed with the flock,
Grew solid as a rock!
When will I finally see
Just who created me?!
Who created me? Oh!
Who created me...?!
It's as if I've been designed
For a cause greater than mine
So whatever life is left,
I've no fear in facing death.
It's as if I've been designed,
So who created me?
Design...!
Design...!
Am I...
Designed...?
Or are we all just dust?
Who creates a man?
And was it nature's plan
To promise lands from the ground to the clouds?
Dripping out, I hope he lasts.
'Cause wolves are gonna cry,
And kings are gonna die!
Them wolves are men like me!
It's as if I've been designed
For a cause greater than mine
So whatever life is left,
I've no fear in facing death.
It's as if I've been designed,
So who created me?
Design...!
Design...!
Am I...
Designed...?
For if we're all dust, how can I feel love?
Is it illusion?
Oh, are we all just dust...?
It's as if I've been designed
For a cause greater than mine
So whatever life is left,
I've no fear in facing death.
It's as if I've been designed,
So who created me?
For if we're all dust, how can I feel love?
Is it illusion?
The Enid: 'Who Created Me?'
______________________
However, science is not exclusively observational for on the basis of observations scientists identify and describe laws and universal kinds within the multitude of observable natural events and entities and Science is a theoretical and thinking consideration of nature which aims at comprehending that which is universal in nature ... forces, laws, genera.
'What is now called physics, was formerly called natural philosophy. It is, what is more, a theoretical and thinking consideration of nature, and while on the one hand it does not concern itself with determinations such as these purposes, which are external to nature, on the other hand it does aim at comprehending that which is universal in nature as it presents itself in a determinate form, i.e. forces, laws, genera. Here the content is not a simple aggregate, but is distributed through orders and classes, and must be regarded as an organic whole. In that the philosophy of nature is a comprehending consideration, its object is the same universal; it is however the universal for itself, which it regards in its own immanent necessity, according to the self-determination of the Notion'.
- 'Philosophy of Nature'
Natural science is empirical not because it is exclusively observational but because its theoretical component, the identification of universal genera and laws within perceptible phenomena, is underpinned by its observational component and unlike philosophical thinking scientific thinking about Nature always starts from and remains informed by observation and given this road understanding as to how natural science is empirical under the heading of natural science is modern science as well as ancient and medieval natural philosophy but modern science is distinctive in its sustained attention to the empirical reflected in its empirical method. The method of philosophy of nature is not empirical but he presents us with two interpretations of it in the passage quoted above. First the philosopher of nature theorizes nature by initially learning from empirical science and then rationally reconstructing scientific claims and not only must philosophy be in agreement with experience of Nature but the origin and formation of the philosophical science has empirical physics as its presupposition and condition yet the procedure for originating and preparing a science is not the same as the science itself and in this the former that is to say experience can no longer appear as the foundation [als Grundlage] which here should rather be the necessity of the concept.
'The relationship of philosophy to what is empirical was discussed in the general introduction. It is not only that philosophy must accord with the experience nature gives rise to; in its formation and in its development, philosophic science presupposes and is conditioned by empirical physics. The procedure involved in the formation and preliminaries of a science is not the same as the science itself however, for in this latter case it is no longer experience, but rather the necessity of the Notion, which must emerge as the foundation. It has already been pointed out that in the procedure of philosophic cognition, the object has not only to be presented in its Notional determination, the empirical appearance corresponding to this determination also has to be specified, and it has to be shown that the appearance does in fact correspond to its Notion. This is not however an appeal to experience in regard to the necessity of the content, and an appeal to what has been called intuition, which was usually nothing more than a purveyance of random concepts by means of fanciful and even fantastic analogies, is even less admissable here. These analogies may have a certain value, but they can only impose determinations and schemata on the objects in an external manner'.
- 'The Philosophy of Nature'
To insure a proper agreement with empirical scientific findings, the philosopher must originate or prepare his or her theory by learning from scientists about the basic forms (the deeper genera, forces, laws, etc.) that organize the perceptible natural world. Natural forms or structures are the patterns or ontological structures embodied in perceptible natural events and entities. Natural entities or phenomena are the particular events and entities instantiating such general structures. Furthermore the philosopher has to provide an additional non-empirical, justification for these empirically supported scientific claims in terms of the necessity of the concept. A passage elsewhere wherein he commences the methodological preamble continued in the introduction to the 'Philosophy of Nature' suggests that the philosopher should provide this conceptual justification by working out through a priori reasoning why each of the natural forms identified by scientists must exist and have the characteristics it does for philosophy does owe its development to the empirical sciences but it gives to their content the fully essential shape of the freedom of thinking (the a priori) as well as the validation [Bewährung] of necessity (instead of the warranting [Beglaubigung] of the content because it is simply found to be present and because it is a fact of experience).
'It can happen, even in a developed philosophy, that only abstract principles or determinations are apprehended (for instance, 'That in the Absolute all is one', 'The identity of the subjective and the objective'), and that with regard to what is particular these same principles and determinations are simply repeated. With reference to the first abstract universality of thinking, there is a correct and more fundamental sense in which the development of philosophy is due to experience. On the one hand, the empirical sciences do not stop at the perception of single instances of appearance; but through thinking they have prepared the material for philosophy by finding universal determinations, genera, and laws. In this way they prepare the content of what is particular so that it can be taken up into philosophy. And, on the other hand, they contain the invitation for thinking, to advance to these concrete determinations. The assumption of this content, through which the immediacy that still clings to it, and its givenness, are sublated by thinking, is at the same time a developing ofthinking out of itself. Thus, philosophy does owe its development to the empirical sciences, but it gives to their content the fully essential shape of of the freedom of thinking (or of what is a priori) as well as the validation of necessity (instead of the content being warranted because it is simply found to be present, and because itis a fact of experience) . In its necessity the fact becomes the presentation and imitation of the activity of thinking that is original and completely independent.
- 'The Encyclopaedia logic'
More specifically, Hegel hints that the philosopher should produce this proof of the necessity of empirically identified natural forms by showing that they compose an intrinsically necessary whole.
'The material prepared out of experience by physics, is taken by the philosophy of nature at the point to which physics has brought it, and reconstituted without any further reference to experience as the basis of verification. Physics must therefore work together with philosophy so that the universalized understanding which it provides may be translated into the Notion by showing how this universal, as an intrinsically necessary whole, proceeds out of the Notion. The philosophic manner of presentation is not arbitrary, it does not stand on its head for a while because it has got tired of using its legs, nor does it paint up its every-day face just for a change; the ways of physics are not adequate to the Notion, and for that reason advances have to be made'.
- 'The Philosophy of Nature'
By implication, the task is to situate each form as the necessary consequence of the one before it thereby establishing that all the forms identified by empirical scientists require one another so that given knowledge of any one form one can acquire knowledge of all the rest independently of experience and philosophers discover in Nature the same structuring patterns as empirical scientists but by a different, rational, route and so the idea is that philosophy of Nature involves rationally reconstructing empirical findings.
'The South Wind or the Breezy Day', Charles Courtney Curran, (1861 - 1942)
Dedicated as always to my lovely One, the wind beneath my wings.. my hero ...
… Oh, oh, oh, oh, oh
It must have been cold there in my shadow
To never have sunlight on your face
You were content to let me shine, that's your way
You always walked a step behind
… So I was the one with all the glory
While you were the one with all the strength
A beautiful face without a name for so long
A beautiful smile to hide the pain
… Did you ever know that you're my hero
And everything I would like to be?
I can fly higher than an eagle
For you are the wind beneath my wings
… It might have appeared to go unnoticed
But I've got it all here in my heart
I want you to know I know the truth, of course I know it
I would be nothing without you
… Did you ever know that you're my hero?
You're everything I wish I could be
I could fly higher than an eagle
For you are the wind beneath my wings
… Did I ever tell you you're my hero?
You're everything, everything I wish I could be
Oh, and I, I could fly higher than an eagle
For you are the wind beneath my wings
'Cause you are the wind beneath my wings
… Oh, the wind beneath my wings
You, you, you, you are the wind beneath my wings
Fly, fly, fly away, you let me fly so high
Oh, you, you, you, the wind beneath my wings
Oh, you, you, you, the wind beneath my wings
… Fly, fly, fly high against the sky
So high I almost touch the sky
Thank you, thank you
Thank God for you, the wind beneath my wings
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Coming up next:
Alternative interpretations of the method.
To be continued ...