On February 28, the verbal altercation at the White House between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the U.S. President and Vice President was not merely another scandalous episode characteristic of Trump’s presidency. Instead, it marked the definitive acknowledgment of the transformed international realities.
Political scientists Alexander Cooley and Daniel Nexon, in their 2020 book Exit from Hegemony: The Unraveling of the American Global Order, explained that the unipolar, liberal world order established in the 1990s was undergoing a profound transformation. This transformation, or in the case of the U.S., the exit from hegemony, occurs on three levels: from above, from within, and from below.
At the global level ("from above"), the exit takes the form of alternative geopolitical, economic, and ideological models emerging alongside the Western model. This primarily refers to China, but also, to some extent, Russia, which in 2022 openly challenged the so-called rules-based liberal world order.
The exit "from below" happens when smaller actors, recognizing the emergence of these alternatives—both globally and regionally—realize they can reject the behavioral models and benefits (economic, military-political) offered by the West and instead seek benefits from non-Western actors, whose prescribed behavioral models are often more advantageous.
Finally, the exit "from within" takes shape through various political movements emerging in the West that question the viability of the liberal world order. In Europe, such groups include right- and left-wing populists and extremists. In the U.S.—the center of the world order—such a movement has already come to power.
The authors argued that the exit from hegemony had already occurred by 2020. The U.S. had transitioned from being the dominant power in the international system to being a primary power. However, the shift from dominance to primacy became particularly evident during the first weeks of Trump’s second term.
The U.S. President is now openly questioning the international architecture and infrastructure that have supported American dominance for decades. For Trump’s administration, maintaining dominance is seen as costly and inefficient. Instead, they seek to concentrate resources on regions and issues deemed vital to U.S. interests.
What happened yesterday at the White House was perhaps the most vivid expression of this process. Both the Ukrainian president and, earlier, the Armenian prime minister used language in Washington that is now outdated and alien to the new administration. As expected, Trump’s foreign policy is highly transactional—devoid of diplomatic etiquette and ideological pretense.
The disrespect shown toward Zelensky, along with the demand for a contract related to natural resources, reflects these approaches and style. The White House confrontation also made it clear that a unified Euro-Atlantic alliance, in practice, no longer exists. Nearly all European leaders publicly supported the Ukrainian president after the incident. While this situation could theoretically change with a new administration in Washington, it is evident that the consequences of Trump’s second term will leave a lasting impact on U.S.-Europe relations.
At this moment, the key question is how this process will affect our region and Armenia’s security.
The first conclusion is that Washington is unlikely to maintain the same level of engagement in the South Caucasus as before. The fundamental shift in the U.S. position on Ukraine, its efforts to end the Russia-Ukraine war at any cost, and its focus on other priorities offer little hope that the U.S. will maintain any significant interest in the South Caucasus. Given recent developments and the clearly transactional and self-serving nature of American foreign policy, this might not be the worst outcome. Azerbaijan, rather than Armenia, has stronger preconditions for finding common ground with such an approach from the American administration.
However, the reduction of U.S. involvement will create a significant vacuum in the region—one that could theoretically be filled by the European Union. Yet the fundamental changes occurring in U.S. policy are already having a snowball effect. In Europe’s leading countries, discussions have resumed on the need for EU strategic autonomy. However, given the EU’s decision-making process, its massive technological dependence on the U.S., and various other factors, this will be a long-term process. Moreover, in the short term, these changes might even lead to reduced European engagement in different regions, as resources will be redirected toward strengthening Europe’s own defense capabilities. For instance, the UK has already decided to increase its military budget by cutting funds for foreign aid and international development.
Under these circumstances, the Armenian government’s approach in recent years—centered around expecting international support—has become entirely outdated. The importance of maintaining internationally “legitimate” behaviour to ensure Armenia’s security and sovereignty has diminished significantly. If the Armenian government does not adapt its thinking, rhetoric, and security toolkit accordingly, it could find itself in a more precarious position than Zelensky at the White House. After all, in our region, there are actors who would eagerly embrace Trump-style foreign policy methods and rhetoric.
Tigran Grigoryan
The article was originally published in Armenian on CivilNet.