Zhanna Avagyan: Tigran, this week the Yerevan Dialogue Diplomatic Forum was held, organized by Armenia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Various international politicians, diplomats, and representatives of think tanks were invited. As far as you’ve managed to follow the forum, what impression did you get overall? Who was involved, who was invited, and what was the general purpose?
Yes, first of all, let’s note that the mere organization of such a forum is probably an important thing. It was first organized last year, during a time when relations with Azerbaijan were quite tense. I think at the time it was seen as a stabilizing factor. It's a common format—most countries have forums of this kind. Azerbaijan does, as do all neighboring countries. But this year, there were of course serious questions regarding some of the participants.
Let’s start with the fact that the main guest, the most prominent guest of the forum, was Slovakia’s Prime Minister Robert Fico. This is somewhat odd because Armenia talks about the need for European integration, for building closer ties with the European Union—and yet it invites a figure who is not very popular within the EU, who criticizes Brussels’ policies on various issues, and who has very close ties with the Russian authorities. Let me remind you that he also participated in the May military parade in Moscow. So, he’s a very controversial figure, a populist leader. By inviting such people, the message of the forum may be distorted, because in today’s Europe, there is a very mixed attitude toward such politicians.
Another high-level official who participated in the forum—and whose participation can also be questioned—was Hungary’s Foreign Minister. One might argue that it's important to work directly with problematic countries. We know that Hungary and several similar countries often create obstacles for Armenia in its relations with the European Union. But if that was the purpose, then it seems that goal was not achieved.
For example, in recent months, Hungary has once again blocked the allocation of EU financial assistance to Armenia through the European Peace Facility. During one of the panel discussions at the forum—where Hungary’s Foreign Minister was also a speaker—the moderator asked him why Hungary was blocking the non-lethal aid intended for Armenia, which is not meant for military use but rather for things like building military hospitals, for instance. The answer was that a certain balance must be maintained: if Armenia is to receive such aid, then Azerbaijan must receive aid as well.
Let me remind you that a similar situation occurred last year when Hungary again blocked aid, and only after funds were allocated to Azerbaijan for demining did Hungary lift the blockade. So, overall, even that goal was not met—judging by the Hungarian Foreign Minister's public statements.
That’s the official part. In the unofficial part, there were also problematic figures and situations. Let's start with the most paradoxical case: Armenia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs invited to the forum someone who had been banned from entering Armenia two or three years ago.
Who are we talking about?
We’re talking about Joshua Kucera, a well-known journalist who now works for the International Crisis Group. At the time, he was working as a journalist, and when he tried to enter Armenia, he was stopped at the border and denied entry. As far as I know, that issue was resolved later—not at the time, but months, maybe even a year later. At the time, there was no explanation for why that decision was made.
Kucera is a controversial figure. I myself have criticized his journalism—not the journalism per se, but rather his various posts on Twitter and other platforms, which often gave the impression of false balance or false equivalence. But let’s set Kucera aside—the issue isn’t about him personally, but about the approach. You ban a journalist from entering the country, and then a few years later you not only invite him to a forum, but put him on a panel alongside a high-ranking official. He participated in a panel discussion with the Secretary of the Security Council, Armen Grigoryan.
This suggests either a lack of professionalism or problems in related areas. But actually, inviting Kucera wasn’t even the most problematic aspect of the forum. They also invited people who closely cooperate with the Azerbaijani authorities—specifically, those who participate in conferences organized by ADA University, held in Nagorno-Karabakh. One such individual was publicly announced as a guest, but ultimately did not come to Armenia—not because of any steps taken by the Foreign Ministry, but due to flight issues, as I understand it.
Another expert, also representing Hungary, has a memorandum of cooperation with Farid Shafiyev’s center—that same Farid Shafiyev we often discuss in our program. This indicates a clear, close collaboration with the Azerbaijani presidential administration’s propaganda apparatus.
Now, one might argue that it’s necessary to work with everyone, to try to change their views—but in some cases, changing minds is simply not possible. There’s a difference between trying to influence someone who holds sincere opinions, and dealing with experts or groups that are clearly working with the Azerbaijani government due to shared interests.
Inviting them to the forum is not going to hinder that collaboration or activity. Overall, I think Armenia is taking no proactive steps. For example, the ADA University conferences held in the territory of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast—Armenia has never condemned or even publicly criticized them. It’s a paradoxical situation, isn’t it?
While Azerbaijan, at the highest state level, is erasing entire neighborhoods in Stepanakert and destroying the cultural heritage of those territories, at the same time some Western experts are going to that very city to participate in conferences. That, at the very least, should raise questions.
Armenia’s authorities, understandably for political reasons, are silent about these matters—but at the very least, they could have chosen not to invite such people, not to legitimize them, not to send the message to the international community that these individuals are acceptable interlocutors for us.
By the way, were you or anyone from your organization invited or involved in the forum?
No, we haven’t received an invitation—not only to this event but also to others. And in some sense, yes, it is paradoxical. It turns out that for the authorities, it’s more acceptable to invite various Azerbaijani lobbyists than people who, yes, at times criticize the government’s policies—but we never cross the line of constructive criticism. We try to remain within the realm of expert analysis. But this has, by and large, become a noticeable trend in recent years, where the authorities mainly engage with their loyal groups—their loyal experts and loyal figures.
And I’ve said this publicly several times: if the price of independence is that we’re not invited to certain events, then I’m glad we’re not invited to certain events. Fortunately, Armenia is still not the kind of country where harsher measures are taken in response to criticism.
Now let’s turn to another aspect of the Forum—specifically, to Nikol Pashinyan’s speech, during which he presented a video and a special presentation outlining his vision for the unblocking of regional communication routes. He’s been speaking about this for several months, but the details were kept closed. Apparently, he revealed them at this forum. So, how does he envision all this, and to what extent do you think it will be acceptable?
Yes, as you correctly pointed out, Pashinyan essentially disclosed the Armenian proposals on unblocking communications, which had been sent to Baku after the BRICS summit in Kazan late last year. For months, there had been discussions about what exactly these proposals were. It was known they pertained to freight transport by rail and that the idea involved a simplified regime of some sort. But at the forum, Pashinyan presented the proposal.
The idea is this: Armenian locomotives would enter Azerbaijani territory at the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, attach to Azerbaijani freight trains, undergo customs and border checks on the Armenian side, then travel through the southern part of Armenia—through the Meghri region—reaching the Nakhchivan border. There, those same Armenian locomotives would again cross into Azerbaijani territory to complete the freight transfer.
The Armenian Prime Minister also emphasized that this would be implemented on a reciprocal basis. That is, if Azerbaijan gains the ability to transport freight through Armenian territory, then Armenia should likewise gain the same opportunity—specifically through Nakhchivan, meaning through a Meghri-Yeraskh connection.
After this presentation, it became largely clear why Azerbaijan hasn’t and is unlikely to accept the proposal.
Why? Because of the declassification?
No. The problem isn’t with the fact that it was revealed—the issue lies in the proposal itself? No, I don’t think the proposal is problematic. On the contrary, I think it’s a rather creative approach.
I’m trying to look at the situation from Azerbaijan’s perspective. Especially since 2023, this issue has become largely one-sided in the negotiations. Before that, there was Nagorno-Karabakh inhabited by Armenians,, there was the Lachin Corridor, and Azerbaijan tried to draw a kind of parallel between the two issues. But now, with Nagorno-Karabakh and the Lachin Corridor no longer in the picture, Azerbaijan still insists on opening these communications based on its own terms.
It’s a bit of a paradoxical situation, of course, but Baku’s main argument is that Azerbaijani citizens and freight passing through Armenian territory should not interact with Armenian border guards. They say it’s a psychologically difficult process due to the history of the conflict, trauma, and so on—psychological traumas. And I believe this proposal was precisely a response to that so-called concern. Of course, it wasn’t a real concern—it was more of a diplomatic maneuver, the point of which was to insist on an uninterrupted connection, so that Azerbaijani trains wouldn’t be stopped on Armenian territory. And Armenia, of course, proposed this option. But I don’t think Azerbaijan is going to be interested in any of it.
Firstly, because they want to pass through Armenian territory exactly according to their own model—that is, for Azerbaijani trains to enter Armenian territory without any serious checks or stops and reach Nakhichevan freely.
Secondly, Azerbaijan is clearly not interested in the principle of reciprocity. Their position is that Armenia should provide the transit route with as minimal an Armenian presence and control as possible, and they will continue to insist on that. So, it’s not surprising that there still hasn’t been any response from them.
Having said all this, we should note that at this stage, this might also be seen as a diplomatic maneuver on Armenia’s part—offering a solution, and one that the international community might find reasonable. I saw that various diplomats also reacted on Twitter and other platforms, saying it’s quite a good solution.
But still, this won’t satisfy Azerbaijan’s demands. And soon we may find ourselves in a situation where Azerbaijan completes the construction of its part of the railway up to the Armenian border, while there is still no agreement on this issue. Azerbaijan does not accept this proposal, and Armenia—well, I don’t think Armenia is inclined to accept the Azerbaijani version either.
Thank you, Tigran.
Thank you as well.