The full agreement on the text of the peace treaty by Yerevan and Baku has sparked heated debates in Armenia. In recent days, various politicians and commentators have put forward theses that mislead the public rather than bring clarity to the current situation.
The first message from government representatives following the agreement on the treaty text was that the document serves Armenia's interests since it does not contain a provision regarding a corridor. However, making such a claim after fully accepting Baku’s demands on the last two unresolved points was itself an indication of a lack of strong arguments to justify this step.
It is a well-known fact that the provisions related to the unblocking of regional communications were removed from the peace treaty months ago by mutual agreement of the parties to facilitate the process. This does not mean that such an agenda does not exist or that Armenia’s vision for the unblocking process is acceptable to Azerbaijan. Moreover, the absence of principles for unblocking regional communications in the peace treaty significantly weakens the document and preserves risks even if the treaty is signed.
The second notable reaction from government and pro-government circles concerned one of the last two agreed points—the withdrawal of third-party forces from the Armenia-Azerbaijan border. Initially, some experts claimed that this provision did not apply to the EU monitoring mission in Armenia. However, it was obvious that Azerbaijan’s primary goal over the past year was precisely to get rid of this mission, which is why this provision was included in the peace treaty text.
These claims did not last long. Soon, both Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan confirmed that the provision indeed referred to the EU monitoring mission, though they also made some distorting claims.
The main one was the claim that all points were agreed upon based on the principle of reciprocity. However, in the case of the provision on the withdrawal of third-party forces from the border, it is clear that no reciprocity exists. The EU monitoring mission is deployed only in Armenia, and Azerbaijan, at least in the short and medium term, does not require third-party support at the border. Suggestions that this provision might apply to Azerbaijan-Turkey military cooperation are entirely unserious.
Government representatives have also argued that after the treaty is signed and ratified, the EU monitoring mission will withdraw from the border but may continue its activities in Armenia under different functions. However, this raises serious doubts. First, considering Azerbaijan’s behavior in recent years, it can be assumed that Baku will seek to maximize the benefits of this provision and push for the mission’s complete withdrawal from Armenia. Additionally, it is unclear what practical benefits the EU mission could provide if it no longer conducts patrols in border areas.
The third and most paradoxical narrative, promoted by some experts and politicians, is that by making unilateral concessions to Azerbaijan and accepting Baku’s positions on the two unresolved points, Armenia has put Baku in a difficult situation and neutralized its plans. As evidence for this claim, they point to the fact that dozens of countries have welcomed the agreement on the document, supposedly limiting Baku’s maneuvering space.
First, it is natural that any document acceptable to both sides, or its conclusion, will be welcomed by all international actors. The same happened last spring when a document on delimitation was agreed upon. However, at a practical level, such statements cannot influence Azerbaijan’s behavior.
The Armenian government’s approach—that aligning with the international community can strengthen national security—was not relevant in recent years, and in the current period of rapid transformations in the international system, it has become even less relevant.
The claim that Armenia’s unexpected, unilateral concessions have disrupted Baku’s strategic calculations may introduce a novel argument in international relations theory, but on a practical level, it does not withstand any scrutiny. As recent developments have shown, these concessions had no impact on Azerbaijan’s tactics or strategic objectives.
Tigran Grigoryan
The article was originally published in Armenian on Civilnet.