Armenia and Azerbaijan Finalize Peace Tr ...

Armenia and Azerbaijan Finalize Peace Treaty Text: What Comes Next?

Mar 14, 2025



Zhanna Avagyan: Tigran, it became clear yesterday that the negotiation process on the text of the peace agreement has been completed. This was first announced by Azerbaijan's Foreign Minister Bayramov, and then confirmed by Armenia's Foreign Ministry, stating that Armenia has accepted Azerbaijan's proposals regarding the two previously unresolved articles of the peace agreement.

First, I would like to understand what kind of agreement this is and what provisions it includes. Although the full document is not publicly available, there has been discussion about these two disputed articles. 

In general, other key points have also been discussed over time, including by various officials. Overall, this is a framework document, meaning it establishes principles rather than providing specific solutions to issues. Essentially, both sides acknowledge that they have no territorial claims against each other and will not have any in the future, recognizing each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Another point is about the supremacy of the peace treaty over domestic legislation. The two unresolved articles that the parties had struggled to agree on for months concerned the withdrawal of legal claims from international bodies and the presence of third-party forces along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border.

As you may recall, Armenia had long insisted that any withdrawal of third-party forces—primarily referring to the EU monitoring mission—should only apply to those sections of the border that had already been delimited, meaning a very limited area. However, Azerbaijan had repeatedly stated that this approach was unacceptable and largely refused to engage in discussions on the matter. Now, it appears that Armenia has conceded on this issue.

Yesterday, we also learned from Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's statement that Armenia is prepared to withdraw the monitoring mission from at least the border areas after the signing and ratification of the agreement. Essentially, this means that if the treaty is signed and ratified, Armenia will not extend the EU monitoring mission’s mandate or will request the EU not to prolong it. We recall that the mandate was extended for another two years just weeks ago, and this agreement directly concerns that extension. Initially, the terms of the agreement were unclear, but following Pashinyan’s comments, everything became more evident. The apparent calculation is that by the time the treaty is signed and ratified, the two-year extension will have expired, thus resolving the issue automatically.

While Armenian officials claim that they have not negotiated the withdrawal of the EU monitoring mission as a whole, Azerbaijan is clearly referring to the complete removal of the mission from Armenia’s territory. These differing interpretations could lead to future disputes, much like what happened with the November 9 agreement, particularly regarding the ambiguous wording of its ninth article on transportation routes, which both sides interpreted differently.

The second issue concerns the withdrawal of legal claims. There is no doubt that the Armenian government was prepared to take this step, as evidenced by the recent resignation of Armenia’s representative for international legal affairs, Yeghishe Kirakosyan. The only question was about the timing of the withdrawal, and it seems that an agreement has now been reached on those details. 

What are the potential dangers of withdrawing these claims?

Legal experts suggest that if Armenia withdraws these claims now, it will be significantly more difficult to file similar cases in the future. This could undermine the state's credibility in international courts. If Azerbaijan violates the agreement and engages in further aggression against Armenia, the legal process for holding it accountable will become even more complicated. Moreover, past war crimes committed by Azerbaijan, both in Nagorno-Karabakh and against Armenia, will go unpunished, eliminating any hope that they will have consequences.

This dilemma—whether to prioritize justice or peace—is common in conflict resolution. In this case, the Armenian government appears to be prioritizing peace over seeking accountability. However, the lack of guarantees means that these violations could be repeated in the future.

Returning to the issue of the EU monitoring mission, the situation becomes even riskier because several key security-related issues remain unresolved, including transportation routes and border security arrangements. The peace treaty does not address these specific issues; it merely outlines principles, possibly fostering a more favorable atmosphere but leaving major disputes unresolved.

For instance, there is still no agreement on reopening regional communications, including the southern transport routes. Armenia has submitted proposals to Baku, but Azerbaijan has not provided a clear response. The enclaves issue also remains unresolved, though the Armenian government seems inclined toward an exchange—returning Azerbaijani enclaves in exchange for Armenia regaining control of Artsvashen. Delimitation processes could also become contentious, especially when the demarcation reaches Armenian territories currently under Azerbaijani control.

In such a situation, agreeing to withdraw the monitoring mission—regardless of how it is framed—seems unwise. The mission was not a major deterrent, but it played a small role in stabilizing the border. Since its deployment, the situation on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border has become relatively calmer. Whenever Azerbaijan accuses Armenia of military buildup or other actions, the monitoring mission has been able to verify and refute these claims.

Now, with many unresolved issues and uncertainty about whether they will be addressed by the time the treaty is ratified, agreeing to remove the monitoring mission places all trust in Azerbaijan’s goodwill. This is risky, as Azerbaijan has repeatedly reinterpreted agreements to its advantage. Even before the treaty is signed, we are already seeing diverging interpretations of key provisions, particularly regarding third-party presence at the border. This could lead to renewed escalation, with Azerbaijan using these ambiguities to pressure Armenia further.

In the Armenian side’s statement, it was mentioned that they are ready to agree on a time and place for signing. But is it really that easy and urgent to sign this document? 

Here, we come to the second important factor that must certainly be discussed. Although the text of the peace agreement has been agreed upon, the prospects for signing it are still distant. This is because, in the same statement, Bayramov declared that Armenia must first amend its constitution and agree to dissolve the OSCE Minsk Group, and only after that can the document be signed.

Regarding the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group, I don’t think there will be serious problems. Even if Armenia had certain preconditions, such as rejecting the "Western Azerbaijan" discourse, recent developments show that Azerbaijan could also force Armenia to abandon all of that. However, the constitutional issue is much more complicated. 

But Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has stated that he does not believe Armenia's constitution contains any territorial claims against Azerbaijan. Is this a hint that they are not inclined to amend the constitution?

It is evident that the Armenian government has already decided to proceed with constitutional changes, but their goal is to frame it as part of an internal agenda rather than as a response to Azerbaijan’s demand. The recent rhetoric about a "Real Armenia" and other discussions serve to package this Azerbaijani demand in a different way.

However, implementing this decision will be quite difficult. First, it is a lengthy process. Justice Minister Srbuhi Galyan recently stated that the draft constitution should be ready before the next parliamentary elections. If we take that statement into account, much work still needs to be done. Additionally, the constitution’s preamble cannot be amended, so a completely new constitution must be adopted.

One of the key challenges will be ensuring public participation. No matter what the authorities say or how much they talk about the "Real Armenia" concept, the general perception will remain that these constitutional changes are being made at Aliyev’s demand. Ensuring participation in this context will be difficult. The authorities could combine the constitutional referendum with parliamentary elections to boost turnout, but this could also create risks for their own political standing. Even if participation is ensured and a referendum is held, the government will struggle to convince the public to vote in favor of constitutional changes proposed by Aliyev. 

Now, regarding the timeline for signing the agreement—Armenia will likely try to convince Azerbaijan that it is committed to constitutional changes, at least in a closed format, and will propose signing the document now while implementing those changes later. However, I believe Azerbaijan will maintain its position and insist that constitutional amendments come first, followed by the signing of the agreement. There may be creative solutions, such as preliminary signing of the agreed-upon text with the final signing to take place only after Armenia completes its constitutional changes.

To summarize—how much of a guarantee will this document provide for peace, and what mechanisms will be in place if any points are violated? We have the example of the November 9 agreement, and in his recent interview with Turkish journalists, Pashinyan mentioned the importance of learning from history. History shows that even when agreements are signed, attacks can still happen. So what guarantees will exist, and should we be cautiously optimistic about this agreement?

Clearly, many talk about compromises, but at this stage, Armenia has essentially been forced to accept all of Azerbaijan’s demands and positions. Most of the provisions in the document are Azerbaijani demands. While Armenia has attempted to negotiate and present its own perspectives, in the current geopolitical context, the prevailing approach seems to be to sign something—anything—to have at least minimal guarantees against a potential Azerbaijani escalation.

I believe the new Trump presidency has significantly influenced this process. When there is little expectation that the U.S. will be engaged in the region, the thinking may be that it is better to sign even a bad agreement than to leave the situation unresolved. However, recent global developments show that signed documents and written guarantees are often ineffective. My main concern is precisely this: relying on a piece of paper while abandoning the real factors that have maintained some degree of stability in the region, such as the EUMA.

If Azerbaijan once again shifts its stance or accuses Armenia of non-compliance, Armenia could find itself in an extremely vulnerable position. In summary, this document does not provide strong guarantees; it is mainly aimed at creating a favorable atmosphere. Many unresolved issues remain, and there is still no final agreement on those points. Moreover, despite the agreement on the text, it is unlikely that the document will be signed in the near future.

Thank you, Tigran. 

Thank you as well.


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