Trump Gang Deportations: More Than Meets the Eye by Ted Kostis
The Trump administration’s decision to invoke the Alien Enemies Act of 1798 to deport criminal elements such as the Venezuelan gang Tren de Aragua is a strategic and prudent move that aligns with the principles of offensive realism. This policy is not merely about border security but serves a broader geopolitical function: preventing the potential use of criminal organizations as proxy forces in a political warfare or insurrection scenario within U.S. territory. While critics argue that such measures are draconian and legally questionable, the strategic calculus behind these deportations is evident. Unlike Ukraine, where nationalist sentiment played a significant role in preparing a springboard to attack the Russian Federation, Mexico and other Latin American nations lack a comparable unifying nationalist force for that exact purpose. Consequently, criminal gangs, if left unchecked, could become force multipliers for foreign adversaries seeking to destabilize the United States.
The Strategic Logic of Deportation
Offensive realism, as articulated by scholars such as John Mearsheimer (2001), posits that great powers must act proactively to eliminate potential security threats before they materialize. The deportation of organised criminal elements aligns with this doctrine by neutralizing groups that could be leveraged in future hybrid warfare scenarios. Historically, non-state actors have played crucial roles in proxy wars, insurgencies and political subversion, as seen in conflicts in Syria, Libya, and Colombia (Biddle, 2019).
Criminal organizations, especially those with transnational ties, possess the operational infrastructure necessary for destabilization campaigns. These organizations engage in illicit trade, human trafficking and arms smuggling—capabilities that make them attractive assets for state and non-state actors seeking to undermine U.S. sovereignty. By systematically removing these elements, the Trump administration is taking proactive steps to mitigate risks that could be exploited in a future geopolitical confrontation.
The Difference Between Ukraine and the U.S. Situation
One key distinction in the security dynamics of Ukraine was the presence of anti-Russian paramilitary groups adopting a strong anti-Russian sentiment and NAZI ideologies. Thus these nationalist groups played a pivotal role in resisting Russian influence post-2014 and heavily contributed to resisting the Russian Special Military Operation of 2022. Here, the role of the gangs were provided by mercenaries and non-officially sanctioned soldiers of armies hostile to Russia from NATO countries and all over the world.
In contrast, Mexican and Latin American political landscapes lack similar nationalist movements capable of starting a foreign-backed insurgency in the United States. For sure, the state actors of Latin American countries are extremely far from this foreign-backed insurgency scenario, branding this as a non-possibility. Moreover the dominant non-state actors in these regions are criminal organizations, not nationalistic militias hoping to get lands back from the United States.
If the United States were to face a hybrid warfare scenario orchestrated by an adversary such as China, Russia, or even elites with certain interests or transnational cartels with geopolitical ambitions, criminal gangs could serve as ideal foot soldiers for urban destabilization, targeted assassinations, cyber-enabled blackmail operations and all other kinds of political and proxy warfare strategies, tactics and tricks.
Political Warfare and Proxy Insurrection Risks
Political warfare, as defined by George F. Kennan (1948), encompasses a range of activities including propaganda, economic coercion and paramilitary operations. The potential for adversaries to exploit criminal networks within the U.S. as instruments of political warfare should not be underestimated. Historical precedents exist wherein organized crime has been weaponized for geopolitical ends:
The Soviet Union’s Use of Criminal Networks – During the Cold War, the KGB utilized criminal organizations for intelligence-gathering, smuggling and sabotage operations in Western countries (Andrew & Mitrokhin, 1999).
The Mexican Cartels’ Influence Operations – Drug cartels in Mexico have exerted influence over local governments, law enforcement and even electoral outcomes, demonstrating their potential for destabilization (Grillo, 2016).
The Role of Criminal Elements in Hybrid Warfare – Galeotti claims that Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy in Ukraine included utilizing criminal networks to undermine state control and facilitate separatist movements (Galeotti, 2019).
Given these precedents, it is logical to assume that leaving entrenched criminal groups within U.S. borders creates an internal vulnerability that adversaries could one day exploit.
Legal and Political Controversies
Despite the strategic merits of Trump’s policy, legal challenges have emerged. Judge James Boasberg’s temporary restraining order against the deportation of Tren de Aragua members (Oliphant, Gardner, & McKay, 2025) highlights the ongoing debate over executive authority in immigration enforcement. Critics argue that invoking the Alien Enemies Act, historically associated with wartime internment, represents an overreach. However, the law’s broad language provides grounds for its application against transnational criminal organizations engaging in what can be classified as irregular warfare.
Attorney General Pam Bondi’s response—that the judge’s ruling prioritizes the rights of foreign criminals over the safety of Americans—underscores the national security rationale for these deportations. The designation of Tren de Aragua and other cartels as global terrorist organizations in February 2025 (Oliphant et al., 2025) further solidifies the argument that these groups constitute not just criminal threats but existential security risks.
Conclusion
The Trump administration’s gang deportation policy is not merely an immigration issue but a strategic maneuver rooted in offensive realism. By removing criminal elements that could be leveraged in future insurrection or hybrid warfare scenarios, the U.S. is reinforcing its internal security and preempting potential geopolitical threats. The absence of a robust nationalist force within Latin America that would want to attack the United States is a fact, leaving room for the implication of non-state actors, proxy operations and irregular warfare.
Thus, that argument makes criminal organizations particularly susceptible to external manipulation for insurrection purposes, a risk that must be mitigated by the United States National Security before adversaries can exploit it to its full devastating consequences. While adverse legal, ideological and political challenges persist, the broader strategic imperative of Trump's administration remains clear: in an era of global power competition, clear and present internal security vulnerabilities not only cannot be ignored but there is a pressing need for their swift neutralization.
References
Andrew, C., & Mitrokhin, V. (1999). The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB. Basic Books.
Biddle, S. (2019). Nonstate Warfare: The Military Methods of Guerrillas, Warlords, and Militias. Princeton University Press.
Galeotti, M. (2019). We Need to Talk About Putin: Why the West Gets Him Wrong, and How to Get Him Right. Ebury Press.
Grillo, I. (2016). Gangster Warlords: Drug Dollars, Killing Fields, and the New Politics of Latin America. Bloomsbury Press.
Kennan, G. F. (1948). "The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare." National Security Council Memo.
Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. W.W. Norton & Company.
Oliphant, J., Gardner, T., & McKay, R. (2025). "Judge Temporarily Blocks Trump's Use of Wartime Powers to Target Venezuelan Gang Members." Reuters.