A curious thing happened east of Robotyne today, as a solitary armored Ukrainian vehicle charged straight into a ditch at full speed. Ordinarily this wouldn't be remarkable, but the location where the incident took place is. Ukraine likely remotely controlled (or had the driver weigh down the accelerator before bailing) the vehicle and was using it to test Russian defenses. The vehicle was not fired upon, and was only (barely) stopped by an anti tank ditch, only a few dozen yards from Russia's line of "dragon teeth". This took place just west of Verbove, and Ukraine's vehicle for all intents and purposes made it to Russia's first full defensive line; the one Ukraine has partially captured north of Robotyne was incomplete, and did not span the entirety of the front in Zaporizhzhia oblast. The line that the vehicle reached near Verbove does, and it suggests that this part of the front is undermanned and is quite probably largely devoid of mines. If this segment of the front remains so critically short of defenses and troops, if Ukraine can get their logistics in order before Russia, an operation to organize a breach here could be completed quite rapidly. It appears that with the lack of troops in the area and a seeming absence of mines, the only obstacles are the ditch and the dragon teeth (basically concrete pyramids). The former can be dealt with easily with bridging equipment, fascines, bulldozers, or even good old fashioned shovels. The teeth will take more work, but towing equipment can remove them provided they are protected for adequate time. Even assuming Ukraine cannot or is unwilling to push here, they have proven that Russia is facing critical shortages of manpower; if Verbove had few troops defending it, it's extremely likely that other points along the front are in the same situation. Ukraine just had to find one where it's also convenient given their current troop positioning to be able to exploit. If Ukraine opts to go after Verbove and is successful, they will get behind Russia's second defensive line before even finishing off the first, smaller one, which could lead to absolute chaos among Russia's military structure in the oblast. Russia's further defensive lines should, in theory, prevent large territorial gains in such a situation, but it would only go so far to prevent a military disaster as Russia's troops could be sandwiched between their own defenses.
Closer to Robotyne, Ukrainian troops are continuing to advance further to its east and now to its southeast as well. Assuming Ukraine doesn't go for Verbove directly, they are still driving a wedge between it and Robotyne, and will directly hit Russia's next line of defenses with this wedge soon. It would put Ukraine in position to contest Novoprokopivka, located behind Robotyne, or to try to breach Russia's next line. However, Ukraine expended a massive amount of resources for this push, with even some pro Ukrainian bloggers admitting that dozens of Ukrainian vehicles may have been taken out of commission for today's push. Which actually aligns remarkably well with recent Russian claims about the size of Ukraine's push and the casualties inflicted upon their armored vehicles, reports which I had initially dismissed as being greatly inflated. Ukraine also made limited gains in the Kamyanske area, slowly clearing the areas around the southern part of the town.
Ukraine has conducted yet another river island crossing, this time crossing the Konka river again. They landed quite close by but on a different island than their prior Konka crossing, which means that they now have two bases of operations close to the occupied city of Oleshky. With three island beachheads (including the Antonovskiy bridgehead) within a few kilometers of Oleshky, Russia's garrison is being put under increasing strain. I still doubt Ukraine intends to conduct a major operation across the river here at this point in time, but this is an area that Russia did not prioritize enough after their demolition of the Kakhovka dam, and the cracks in their defenses are certainly showing.
Ukraine has finally captured Staromaiorske as Russian defenses in the battered village collapsed. Russia still holds Urozhaine, directly across the Mokri Yaly river, but it is now a very awkward position for them to hold. A bridge (I don't know if it's still standing or not) connects Staromaiorske and Urozhaine; if it is still up, the Russian garrison at Urozhaine will have to contend with threats from their rear. If Russia cannot push back into Staromaiorske imminently, they will likely be forced to withdraw from Urozhaine in the next few days. Ukrainian troops remain just outside of Pryyutne, for now. Russia's defeat at Staromaiorske was important, but they still have the opportunity to prevent a total collapse of their line back to Staromlynivka.
The situation around Bakhmut has been stable for the day, with combat taking place in and around Kurdyumivka, Andriivka, and Klishchiivka in the south. Russian forces still refuse to withdraw to more advantageous terrain, which makes me believe that their logistics may be under more duress than I thought. Otherwise, I cannot see the logic for their continued battles for Klishchiivka, where they are at a great geographic disadvantage. Much as with the south of Bakhmut, there were no major changes northwest or north of Bakhmut.
The situation along the Kharkiv-Luhansk border is fairly murky, with some conflicting reports. Geolocated footage has shown that the breadth of Russia's push towards Borova has widened, but there have also been some claims of Ukrainian attacks towards the side and rear of Russia's push. Overall, I find it likely that Russia still holds the initiative. It's a race against the clock to see if Russia can exploit Ukrainian weakness here before Ukraine scores a major breakthrough in Zaporizhzhia or Donetsk oblasts.
Old export versions of the Abrams tanks, being supplied by the United States, are now expected to arrive in Ukraine in September. Depending on the timing of a great many factors, it's possible that they could come right on time for a decisive push. However, this is notably several weeks past the expected window the New York Times provided for Ukraine to reach Tokmak (if successful in the allegedly expected one to three weeks to reach Tokmak, they could be used for a follow up to Melitopol though). The autumn is another major factor to consider, as it usually brings heavy rains to Ukraine, turning much of the soil to thick mud. And of course, a possible Russian breakthrough in the Kupyansk area in the coming days or weeks could completely force Ukraine to shift their priorities and battle plans. Regardless, they will help to replace the steep armored losses that Ukraine has suffered. Many of these losses will eventually be replaceable as salvageable vehicles are repaired and returned, by many are also damaged beyond repair.
Russia hosted an international conference in Saint Petersburg today, the Russia-Africa summit. Russia is trying to do damage control to their international image, and pledged free grain shipments to a half dozen African countries. The United Nations stated that this gesture does little to compensate for Russia's killing blow to the Black Sea grain deal in terms of raw amount of grain being able to be shipped into international markets. But the most interesting bit of the conference was the presence of no other than Prigozhin, who seemed to be quite at home and welcome in Russia despite ostensibly being exiled to Belarus. For a man who launched a rebellion a month ago and ultimately failed to topple the shitting establishment, it's quite remarkable than he was allowed back into Russia in such a public manner. It makes it all but an absolute certainty that there are a great many details of whatever deal Lukashenko inked between Putin and Prigozhin that have yet to be made public.