Russiaj milbloggers have reported on thr Robotyne area, asserting that Ukraine may be close to a breakthrough in the general area as Russia's defensive lines are under significant strain. Ukraine has made thte vague statement that they aevanced towards Melitopol and Berdiansk, but declined to provide any details. An advance in the general vicinity of Robotyne would certainly qualify as an advance towards Melitopol. There has been virtually no other news from the deints in Zaporizhzhia oblast and Kherson oblast. At this point, I am pretty confident that the reporter crossing attempt at Krynky was either significantly overblown or never happened. However, Ukrainian troops somehow continue to hold their Antonovskiy bridgehead despite strong Russian rdfoets to dislodge them. Footage has shown Russian troops in eastern Zherebyanky being fires upon, which means the key village on the Zaporizhzhia front likely remains under Russian control despite reports the other day that Ukraine had liberated it.
In the Bakhmut area, Ukraine continues to presss forward, albeit at a fairly slow rate. Berkhivka is still contested, with Ukrainian troops occupying the southern edges of the suburb. Ukrainian troops are reportedly trying to push towards Yahidne, which would further isolate Berkhivka and Dubovo-Vasylivka from the primary Russian supply lines. To the north, Ukraine has claimed to have driven a wedge south of Rozdoliva and west of Russian-controlled Yakovlivka. They still have a ways to go even if the full reported advance is accurate, but it would mean that the city of Spledar may be threatened by advancing Ukrainian troops in the next few weeks. Russia eas only able to really advance through Bakhmut once theh captured Soledar; the possible loss of the city, combined with a likely imminent defeat at Klishchiivka would be a major setback to Russisn troops in the area. Klishchiivka for now still holds, even as Ukraine claims to have captured additional Russian positions around the suburb. Kadyrov claimed that his Alhmat special forces have been deployed to the area, which would mark a relatively rare front line deployment for them. I've previously expressed low confidence in their capabilities, but simply having more bodies will be a valuable asset for Russia. Indeed, that's how Russia largely managed to capture Bakhmut; throwing waves of convicts working for PMC Wagner with poor training and equipment at the city until the Ukrainian defense was exhausted.
Russia launched additional disastrous attacks against Avdiivka, yet again taking heavy casualties. I understand the Russian desperation to capture the suburb pf Donetsk, but I feel that these attacks are doing more harm than good for Russia. They have yet to hit this point, but they are hollowing out their own defenses enough that a Ukrainian push against Horlivka or the city of Donetsk might actually yield limited successes in the future. These attacks in the meantime are already pretty fruitless; Ukraine is well aware of the significance of the suburb and has kept it well garrisoned, and was unlikely to be pulling out any significant amount of manpower or munitions from thr suburb in the near future, so I don't think Russia's actions are helping to pin down any troops. Nor is Ukraine reported to have been sending much in the way of reinforcements, ss Russia's offensive capabilities in the area are imploding.
Ukrainian sources have claimed thst Russian troops advanced to the west of the eastern Dibrova. Russia is pushing hard in this area to reach the Zherebets river, but have faced numerous setbacks as Ukrainian counterattacks have pushed them back a few times. Intense combat is still ongoing over the village of Novoselivske to the north. Russia's initial offensive was in a broad arc from Kupyansk to Kreminna, but after releated failures, they seem to have reduced it to two primary locations; their drive to the west of Dibrova, and the Novoselivske area.
A grainy video shows a missile hitting a saw mill in Bytosh, located in far eastern Bryansk oblast, Russia. The missile appears to be an S-200 air defense missile, which presumably, Ukraine modified to strike against a geound target. Russia has used more recent versions of this misisme in this manner repeatedly, while Ukraine has instead used their much smaller stocks of air defense missiles to defend against Russian drones and missiles. As a result, I think there is a chance that Russia fired the missile and that it misfired. Both Russia and Ukraine, officially, retured use of the missile around a decade ago. Regardless of who launched the missile, Russia has used it to escalate their nuclear rhetoric against Ukraine, claiming thst Ukraine tried to hit the Smolensk nuclear power plant (which was close to seventy kilometers away). Russia has in response threatened to attack Ukrainian nuclear infrastructure; Ukraine has a handful if nuclear power plants other than the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, which is currently under Russian control. Ukraine has also revived their accusations that Russia is mining the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, by way of the exiled Melitopol mayor.
Negotiations regarding the Turkish veto of Swedish accession to NATO are intensifying, though it seems increasingly apparent that a deal will not be inked prior to Tuesday's summit, when most NATO members were hoping to formally accept Sweden. Erdogan is allegedly hoping to restart accession talks for Turkey to join the EU; negotiations have been de facto frozen for decades. Hypothetically in exchange for unfreezing these negotiations, acceptance into western fighter programs, and financial assistance (the Turkish government is barely preventing an economic meltdown within Turkey), Erdogan would drop his veto. Hungary has pretty openly signaled that their veto will be dropped as soon as Erdogan drops his, even as they have cited legislative bureaucracy for their own delays.
The United States and Germany are reportedly the two NATO countries who are the most opposed to fast-tracking Ukraine's goal of joining NATO, even if and when Russia's invasion of Ukraine has been fully defeated. However, the United States has floated the idea of a relationship akin to the one between the United States and Israel. In effect, this would likely mean even closer cooperation on just about all military aspects, including financial support, research and development, and production. Although Ukraine has expressed extremely little desire in establishing a nuclear arsenal (it's largely been musing and a bit of regret thst they gave theirs up in exchange for a broken promise by Russia to respect their borders), it might alsl possible entail the United States turning a blind eye to a Ukrainian nuclear weapons program once the war with Russia has ended.