Toward a Ludic Lunatology: Rethinking th ...

Toward a Ludic Lunatology: Rethinking the phenomenology of madness

Jan 31, 2024

The following essay was submitted in December 2023 for the fifth module on the MSc Mad Studies at Queen Margaret University, OM209 - Interrogating Mad Studies


INTRODUCTION

Approaching madness from the perspective of play might be thought of as having two key dimensions. Firstly, it can be used to explore how we make sense of particular aspects of the world – understanding. Secondly, it can be used as a way of thinking about how society might be structured or function differently – change. However, this implies a disconnect between the phenomenological and the sociological. It is important to take seriously the process of social kindling: ‘that the implicit and explicit ways in which a local social world gives significance and meaning to sensation…will alter not only the way those sensations are interpreted but the likelihood and the quality of the sensation itself’ (Tanya M Luhrmann et al., 2015). I suggest that by transforming our discourse – and thereby our ontology – surrounding the phenomenology of madness to one based on play, we can actually change the way it is lived. This is a way of countering the ‘ontologic injustice’ (Liebert, 2018, p.13) perpetrated by Western colonialism that has historically transformed what can simply be seen as play into madness.

DE-REIFYING EXPERIENCE

Mad Studies, which draws heavily on the so-called “lived experience” of those labelled mad, must problematise the very ‘category of experience not as a universal, natural, and supremely authentic entity – as many take it to be – but as a process built sharply out of cultural, historical, political, and pragmatic forces’ (Desjarlais, 1997, p.11) . The problem with the study of such “experience” – phenomenology – is that its ‘logic is haunted by a problematic collapse of ontology and epistemology, of being and knowing, in which the supposed realities of experience are given the status of facts’ (Desjarlais, 1997, p.13). Ultimately, taking experience as a given means relying on sanist and Western assumptions regarding the dualistic nature of reality, and the self that experiences that reality as involving subjectivity, cognition and stability. Indeed, to speak of the “experience of madness” presupposes accepting that it is some kind of experience and not something else. In this way, phenomenology fails by installing the transcendent principle within experience itself. Rather it must be seen that experience is simply ‘one form of life among many’ (Desjarlais, 1997, p.10). Indeed, the origin of the English word “experience” is “experiment”. It is better to understand that what we label as madness is not an experience at all, but rather an experimenting – a playing – with the very category of experience: ‘anything that challenges this certainty is penalised by the wider society’ (Humpston, 2022). Heidegger famously argues that ‘only as phenomenology is ontology possible’ (Heidegger, 1978, p.60). However, instead of prioritising individual experience as the foundation for understanding madness, we must de-phenomenologise madness and instead aim at the level of ontology. I suggest that we can do that by replacing the category of experience with play. Play here is understood not as an experience but rather as ‘an essential element of man's ontological makeup, a basic existential phenomenon…that cannot be explained as deriving from other existential phenomena’ (Fink, Saine and Saine, 1968, p.9). The heart of play is an ontological disposition, or praxis, of playfulness (Russell et al., 2017, p.2)

AGAINST A PHENOMENOLOGY OF PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

Phenomenological approaches to madness, which do well to move beyond diagnostic criteria, nevertheless tend to focus on the abnormal alteration of experience (Corin and Lauzon, 1994) associated with the psychotic-disorders, primarily schizophrenia, the ‘sublime object of psychiatry’ (Woods, 2011) as if it were a description. Popular models characterise this experience as involving ontological-ontic dimensions (Crisp, 2018) of, amongst others: an altered perception of reality (Leiviskä Deland, Karlsson and Fatouros-Bergman, 2011), a disturbance of the self (Sass and Parnas, 2003), temporal distortion (Vogel et al., 2019) and abnormal space experiences (Stanghellini et al., 2020). Although this literature often emphasises the causal contribution of this subjective experience to schizophrenia (Chung, Fulford and Graham, 2007, p.6) and the agentical role the psychotic subject has in this process (Hook, 2020, p.112) it nevertheless presupposes its experiential, and disordered, nature. The discourse remains trapped within an explicitly normative conception of experience. The phenomenologist is ‘imprisoned in a…model in which experiences…must clearly refer either to the inner world (the subjective) or the outer world (the objective)’ (Kusters, 2020, p.386). This fundamentally fails to account for an ‘idea of the world and the subject as ongoing production, where the dualism between subject [experiencer] and object [experiences] no longer functions’ (Olsson, 2009, p.207). Approaching madness-as-play rather than as an experience will be shown to better account for this.

MADNESS IN THE METHOD

It is crucially important that “If Mad Studies achieves its objectives, it needs to have as part of its end goal the shaking up, the disturbing, of all forms of academic knowledge” (Ingram, 2016). This means maddening the message and the medium; at all levels we need to start playing again. This essay therefore draws on the fifth dimension of a new architectural approach to pedagogy (Bailey, 2022). This dimension of the model combines spatial shifts with critical analysis as a way to explore the implications of an ontology of play for four key ontological constituents – reality, self, time and space – problematised by madness. It’s worth remembering that despite their separate treatment ‘for our automatic mental lives, these ontological constituents…are not experienced as distinct. They are rather entirely interlaced and mutually implicated in one another’ (Wiggins and Schwartz, 2006, p.117) .You will physically be required to move through four different spaces. You’ll need a printed copy of this essay, a piece of plain paper, a pen and an open mind.

IN THE OFFICE: PLAYING WITH REALITY

Sat at your desk, wedded firmly in your chair to the physical world, think about how madness-as-play challenges what reality means. Jot down any thoughts or drawings you have. Then read.

The paradox of play and madness is best accommodated through an ontology that sees in play “not something that lacks reality but something that is engaged in a process of actualization following the plane that gives it its particular reality” (Deleuze, 2001, p,31). Play is not the becoming-real of possibility but the becoming-actual of virtuality. This distinction is essential because in the latter the possible always resembles the real from which it is constructed. Play, like madness, is not so constrained, there are radical elements that do not adhere to the real. In play ‘ever-present virtualities are actualised, producing moments in which [we] are becoming-different; that is, following [our] own desires rather than following…determined pathways’ (Lester, 2013, p.131). It is consequently not trapped within the category of experience at all; it doesn’t represent a change to existing conceptions of reality, of self, time or space, but rather produces its own; ‘it does not result from any limitation of a pre-existing possibility’ (Deleuze, 2022, p.212, 2022), but is a ‘plunging into an intense actualization of virtuality’ (Olsson, 2009). This is precisely ‘what all societies dread absolutely as their most profound negative: namely, the decoded flows of desire…[that] deliberately scrambles all the codes’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983, p.161, 15).

Madness becomes suffering with the subject’s awareness of the impossibility of their subjective experience (Humpston, 2022), ‘a rather disconcerting, kind of insight into their own condition’ (Sass, 1995, p.3). Approaching madness through the playful ontological duo of virtual/actual rather than the hard line real/possible allows the subject to escape being ‘trapped in a Möbius strip of infinite possibilities which are, in essence, not possible at all’ (Humpston, 2022). Instead of the subject seeing ontological changes as ‘impossible experiences’ (Humpston, 2022) they have a framework in which these changes are accepted as a virtuality that possesses ‘a full reality by itself’ (Deleuze, 2022, p.211). This

possibility of playing in some way with the rules, of reopening the signifiers and of infusing some interstitial space within the compactness of the perceived world...a way of escaping the rigidity associated with psychosis and avoiding entrapment within insuperable contradictions (Corin and Lauzon, 1994)

Seeing madness-as-play in this way also fundamentally counters the ‘ontologic injustice’ (Liebert, 2018, p.13) that is at the heart of psychiatry, and colonialism, by affirming that ‘the world of the imagination – the world of the soul – and of the spirit is just as real as physical reality’ (Anzaldua, 1987, p.37, 1987).

ON THE COUCH: THE MAD (NON)SELF

Move to your living room and lie down on your couch. Think about how madness-as-play might challenge our understanding of the self. Jot down any thoughts or drawings you have. Then read.

A wide literature (Lysaker and Lysaker, 2010) suggests that what is labelled as mad minimally involves ‘self-related’ complaints, and at its most extreme, a full-blown disunity of the self (Parnas and Henriksen, 2016). In contemporary phenomenology the most influential view (Sass and Feyaerts, 2023) has been on the notion of madness (schizophrenia in particular) as a disturbance of minimal selfhood, the ipseity (“the self itself”) disorder model (IDM). This refers to an undermining of the ‘fundamental for-me-ness’ which is seen as ‘a necessary and universal feature’ of experience (Henriksen, Parnas and Zahavi, 2019). This ‘structural alteration’ in the sense that experience is one’s own makes the subject ‘vulnerable to the emergence of an intrusive radical alterity’ (Parnas and Henriksen, 2016), as in delusions, voices, hallucinations, thought insertions and so forth.

The problem with this understanding is that it presupposes a ‘unitary phenomenological structure’ (Ratcliffe, 2017) that universalises an individualistic Western cultural conception of selfhood. In phenomenology, there is an almost unanimous acceptance of an implicit pre-reflective self-consciousness. In other contexts, such a conception of “me-ness” doesn’t exist in the same way. Rather the self, even the minimal self, is defined as including others (Alphonsus et al., 2023). In some cases, such as the Iban people, it appears that radically different construals of self make certain symptoms of madness inconceivable; in the absence of a conception of a thinking self, integral to IDM, the Iban appear to not report thought insertion and withdrawal at all (Barrett, 2003). Even if the minimal self is redefined as interpersonal (Ratcliffe, 2017), such that the (resultant or preceding) weakening of the self-boundary might be taken as a universal in some way, ‘more flexible and changeable ideas of the self shaped by the social world’ (Alphonsus et al., 2023) can nevertheless positively transform the psychotic process, such that ‘felt distress and vividness vary across cultures’ (Lee, Griffith and Park, 2021). As is the case in terms of bodily disturbances (Lee, Griffith and Park, 2021) and hearing voices (T M Luhrmann et al., 2015), Western egocentric culture seems to produce greater problems in this regard.

It’s been observed that a stable dissolution of the minimal self, as is the realisation of emptiness in Buddhism, is ultimately what the mystic tries to achieve (Parnas and Henriksen, 2016); “In the East, spiritual life and experiential journeys take their practitioners across a region that, in the West, is fenced off with psychiatric barbed wire” (Kusters, 2020, p.475). At the very least, a weakening of the boundaries of the self is central to meditation, intimacy, art (Alphonsus et al., 2023) and play. What is seen as centrally different in these “experiences” is that they are willfully adopted, whereas in madness they are involuntary. In the first case there is often a serene letting go of control and in the other a debilitating loss of control of experience (Alphonsus et al., 2023). However such an understanding deprives mad subjects of the role of agency, who often see ‘themselves as partly or fully “responsible” for onset, and actively involved in the shaping and elaboration of positive symptoms’ (Jones et al., 2016).

Ultimately, the problem here is that we understand changes to the self in experiential rather than ontological terms. There is no stable self, minimal or otherwise, that can be disrupted or lost in the first place; nor is there any experience separate from it. Rather the self is always an ongoing production, a verb never a noun, a continuous becoming (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987) in which the construction of the world is not separate from the experience of it; a ‘non-axiomatic subject whose impetus is the infinite creative expression of its idiosyncratic constitution’ (Tarulli and Skott-Myhre, 2006, p.192). This is a playful conception of the (non)self, in which we see any changes as a ‘process of being a child becoming different and open to what it not yet is’ (Lester, 2013, p.136). Such a playful attitude that turns the activity of life into play involves ‘openness to self-construction or reconstruction and to construction or reconstruction of the "worlds" we inhabit’ (Lugones, 1987, p.17). It’s been noted that such an attitude to life is what is primarily missing in psychosis, where subjects often seem to end up ‘obsessed by the compactness of their being’ (Corin and Lauzon, 1994). Conversely, the presence of this attitude is associated with positive withdrawal, and has been found to be present in patients that don’t end up readmitted (Corin and Lauzon, 1994) and in Hindu culture (Corin, Thara and Padmavati, 2003), where voices tend to be seen not as experiences but as constructive sources of guidance in their lives (T M Luhrmann et al., 2015).

ON THE STREETS: IT’S PLAYTIME

Walk out onto the streets. Think about how madness-as-play might challenge our understanding of time. Jot down any thoughts or drawings you have. Then read.

Psychopathology frequently implicates ‘a disturbance in time experience as the phenomenon potentially underlying several core features’ (Vogel et al., 2019) of madness. According to its phenomenology ‘temporal continuity underlying conscious awareness no longer proceeds smoothly, but disintegrates’ (Vogel et al., 2019) in some way. Sociologically speaking it is clear that temporal normativity is central to the construct of madness in the first place because ‘madtime flouts the normative schedules of Reason, trips the lockstep of Western teleology, disobeys the dominant beat, and swerves instead into a metaphysical offbeat’ (Bruce, 2021, p.32).

It’s worth remembering that time is always in some way a social imposition. It’s been observed in young children that unless forced to pay attention to it for some reason, ‘time does not appear to be relevant to them in the majority of everyday situations’ (Droit-Volet, 2012). And the nature of time experience varies drastically across cultures, such as in the case of the ‘Māori perspectives of time, where the past, the present and the future are viewed as intertwined, and life as a continuous cosmic process’ (Rameka, 2016) to the extent that ostensibly dead ancestors are accepted as real phenomena ‘who live with their descendants in the physical as well as spiritual world’ (Rameka, 2016). Seeing dead people is obviously likely to raise the concerns of psychiatry, phenomenological or otherwise, in the West. This points again to how the way a culture constructs its metaphysics-ontology directly impacts what is possible or impossible within it.

Reconstructing madness-as-play can radically reconfigure temporality, giving rise to new possibilities. In the children’s play, it is a schizophrenic, effortless, free-flowing multiplicity of temporalities, fast, slow, offbeat, onbeat, starting, stopping, frozen, linear, cyclical. “Play time” is ‘a temporally productive event in its own right’ (Myers, 2016). Similarly, ‘in the landscape of madness, time lies open and exposed. The psychotic can direct time and the way time is structured.’ (Kusters, 2020, p.102). Both are instances of a playing with time. The problem is of course that in madness, unlike in child’s playtime in the playground, madtime doesn’t have a parallel mad space in which to play with time. This disconnection between temporal fluidity and the absence of a corresponding spatial dimension in which it can be lived can provoke a deep sense of disorientation that is central to psychosis. This of course suggests a need for environments – which anthropologically often seem to occur in the ludic time-space of ritual play (Turner, 1974) – in which adults, especially those labelled as psychotic, are free to more meaningfully play with time.

IN THE PARK: PLAYGROUNDS FOR THE MAD

Walk to your nearest park. Think about how madness-as-play might challenge our understanding of space. Jot down any thoughts or drawings you have. Then read.

So-called abnormal space experience is also central to the phenomenological understanding of madness. The most commonly reported experience is of lived space becoming strange and unfamiliar (Stanghellini et al., 2020). It’s been recently argued that this loss of trust, a feeling of at-homeness, flows from a diminished spatial agency that impedes the ‘ability to inhabit, negotiate, and use the different spaces we move through in everyday life [in terms of] the different affordances they [do or do not] offer us.’ (Krueger, 2023). Importantly, such a view emphasises how certain environments are configured (intentionally or otherwise) to enable or deprive access to certain affordances (Krueger, 2023) in a way that can directly induce the disorienting spatial changes we associate with madness. This is a vicious feedback loop: the world is inhospitable to being mad, but pathological mad experiences emerge precisely because the world is inhospitable to them. This is clinical schizophrenia understood in Deleuzean terms as the interruption of the process not the process itself (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983, p.5). This is driven by the political dimension of space, that ‘the exercise of regulatory social authority is inconceivable without recourse to a legitimizing spatial ideology’ (Susen, 2014). Ultimately, the madman has nowhere to go: “You can’t play here.” The madman instead ends up subject to the ‘adaptation police’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983, p.95) which is exactly what produces his “madness” as illness.

If we think of the madman ontologically as actively playing with reality, self and time rather than phenomenologically as passively experiencing changes in them, it demands, as with autism, that ‘instead of trying to “fix” the[m]...(i.e., expecting them to conform to neurotypical styles of embodiment and thinking), we ought to instead construct niches that are more flexible and inclusive’ (Krueger, 2023). But it seems probable that the “neurodivergence” associated with madness is simply beyond that which could ever be tolerable by a society, which might explain the pronounced absence of schizophrenia and bipolar disorders in this discourse. The radical experimentation central to madness-as-play may ultimately require “playgrounds for the mad”.

CONCLUSION

A playful attitude to life can help undermine the weight that Western metaphysics affords these ontological constituents. By recognizing the fluidity and malleability of the world, self, time and space, we open up the possibility of reimagining reality, selfhood, temporality and spatiality, not as rigid “experiences”, but as a dynamic, playful mad becoming. Such a position is, like play itself, nevertheless both potentially liberating but potentially terrifying for both the individual and society.

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