Zhanna Avagyan: Tigran, in recent days, there have been several developments regarding the prisoners held in Baku—protests, hunger strikes, and even a response from the authorities. But before addressing that, I’d like to discuss the true purpose of the trials taking place in Baku. We usually frame these trials as mere acts of theatrical revenge, right? But Azerbaijan has additional plans.
Yes, I think we’ve had the opportunity to discuss this before, but recent developments and signals coming from Baku further confirm the hypothesis that Azerbaijan is using these trials as a means to justify future actions against Armenia. These could be legal actions, or they could serve as political pretexts to launch aggression against Armenia. As I mentioned, in recent days, a number of unofficial statements from the Azerbaijani state have made this clear in explicit terms.
For example, Farid Shafiyev, whom we remember from the leak of the peace treaty text but not only for that, has, over the past few years, functioned as an unofficial spokesperson for the Azerbaijani authorities. When the government wants to avoid making an official statement, they often leak information through him. Shafiyev openly stated that the goal of these trials is to demonstrate that Armenia—and specifically Nikol Pashinyan—is responsible for various past events.
It is also interesting that there has been a shift in Baku’s rhetoric. Previously, they placed the blame solely on Armenia’s former leadership. We recall how Levon Ter-Petrosyan’s speech was unearthed and used as a tool of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy to claim that Armenia committed ethnic cleansing during the First War. But now, they are targeting Nikol Pashinyan personally, and the central message of these fabricated trials is to extract confessions from the POWs to place responsibility on Armenia’s leadership.
We can, of course, discuss how the Armenian public and the Armenian authorities should respond to this information, which can rightfully be called a hybrid tool against Armenia. But the objective is clear. Your point is also relevant—the idea that they are seeking revenge for past traumas by portraying these individuals as perpetrators against Azerbaijan and now claiming to be seeking justice. However, I believe the primary goal is what we discussed earlier: conducting a so-called "Nuremberg trial" against these individuals and shifting responsibility onto the Armenian state.
Now, coming back to the reactions—when Ruben Vardanyan started his hunger strike, it triggered a strong response, leading to protests and hunger strikes in Yerevan by political figures and ordinary citizens. How do you assess the public’s reaction? And if the detainees were not well-known figures like Ruben Vardanyan or members of Artsakh’s military-political leadership, would society have even spoken about the POWs?I want to clarify that I have no negative attitude toward Ruben Vardanyan or anyone else.
Yes, I think the Armenian public is generally concerned about the POW’s situation. However, the latest developments, including the publication of photos from the trial showing clear signs of torture on Ruben Vardanyan and Bako Sahakyan, were a major trigger—alongside Vardanyan’s hunger strike.
As for the reactions, we can break them down into several aspects. Regarding the statements made in Baku’s courts, including by Armenian prisoners of war, I believe it is absolutely unacceptable for these messages to be disseminated in Armenia’s media space. There are two extreme approaches to this issue. One side blames the detainees for making such statements, failing to recognize that no one can endure the torture they are subjected to in Baku’s prisons. It is easy to sit in Yerevan and make patriotic declarations, but no one has the right to judge a person who is enduring Azerbaijani captivity.
A different question is how they ended up in captivity—this can be discussed. What could have been done differently?
Sorry to interrupt, but that’s a question on many people's minds. For example, some are specifically asking why Samvel Babayan was able to pass through the checkpoint and is now here, while others were not.
Yes, our colleague Tatul Hakobyan has recently published a series of articles shedding light on this process. Initially, Azerbaijan demanded the handover of five individuals—primarily former presidents and two other high-ranking officials. At first, Azerbaijan honored this agreement, reached in Yevlakh when the Artsakh delegation went to negotiate. During that period, many were able to pass through the checkpoint. The agreement was that if those five individuals were handed over, others could cross with minimal checks.
This didn’t just apply to Samvel Babayan but to nearly the entire military-political leadership, including those who played active roles in the First Karabakh War. If we follow Azerbaijani media now, accusations are being leveled at a much broader group of individuals who managed to pass through that checkpoint.
So, what was Azerbaijan’s logic?
At first, they seemed inclined to respect the agreement—get the five people they wanted and let the rest go. Now, however, they have shifted their approach.
Returning to the public’s response, as we noted, one extreme reproduces Azerbaijani narratives in the Armenian media and blames detainees for alleged "betrayal." But the other extreme attributes statements to these individuals that they never actually made. The only information coming out of these trials is through Azerbaijan’s state news agency, Azertac, which selectively publishes content that serves Baku’s interests. Some people take these reports, distort the translations, and ascribe false statements to detainees, painting them as heroes when no such statements were made. This is also an irrational response.
In general, I believe that direct statements from these trials should simply be ignored. However, the trials themselves should remain in the spotlight. It is obvious that any statement made during these proceedings has no legitimacy.
I also want to discuss what the Armenian government should do to ensure that the legitimacy of these trials is publicly challenged by all key international actors.
Let’s start with that—both in terms of legitimacy and the broader issue of POWs. What has the Armenian government done so far? There is an impression that it has done nothing, but some steps have apparently been taken.
Yes, I believe there are still some closed-door discussions with Azerbaijan regarding the exchange of prisoners, particularly related to the locations of missing Azerbaijani soldiers’ remains from the First War. However, in terms of Armenia’s official policy on this issue, we can divide it into several phases.
Immediately after the war, as we have previously discussed, it seems that the Armenian government deliberately decided to separate the issue of prisoners from all other negotiation topics. The fact that the prisoner issue is not included in the text of the peace treaty is, of course, a major anomaly. You cannot talk about peace—at even the most minimal level—while POWs remain detained.
I believe the main opportunity to bring those people back was in November-December 2022, when negotiations were taking place regarding Azerbaijan hosting COP29 in exchange for the return of prisoners. Of course, at that time, a group of prisoners was returned to Armenia, but Armenia should have demanded the return of all prisoners because that event was extremely important for Azerbaijan. If the Armenian authorities had decided to go for such a deal, they should have ensured the return of all detainees held in Baku.
I also think that the Prime Minister’s various statements, especially regarding Ruben Vardanyan, did not help this process. When Armenia’s Prime Minister is asked about the fate of the prisoners, particularly Ruben Vardanyan, and he starts repeating some conspiracy theories about him being sent from somewhere, while the person is an Armenian citizen, it is clear that the international community’s response will be accordingly muted. If the Armenian government reacts this way, it is difficult to expect anything substantial from the international community.
We can also note a pattern: when it became clear that this trial was not only directed against the Republic of Armenia but also against the current government itself, some activity began to be observed. We have seen statements from Nikol Pashinyan, such as during a government session where he accused Azerbaijan of using various drugs during the interrogation of prisoners. The Foreign Minister also made a statement on this topic.
Returning to Armenia’s next steps, I believe there should be a clear distinction between the issue of the POW’s return and the trial. Regarding the prisoners’ return, Armenia must continue negotiations with Azerbaijan and work with various partners willing to act as mediators. For example, a few weeks ago, I met with a high-ranking Western official who was interested in taking on a mediating role in Armenia-Azerbaijan relations. We emphasized that this is the main thing a third party can do if it wants to take on a mediating role. If you want to be part of the process, you must be able to secure at least a minimal result.
But who will allow Azerbaijan to accept such mediation?
Look at Viktor Orbán, the Prime Minister of Hungary, a country that until recently had no diplomatic relations with Armenia. Yet, he managed to mediate the return of two or three Armenian prisoners. If Hungary can do this, more influential countries certainly can as well. In any case, there should be active efforts regarding the prisoners’ return.
The second direction at this stage is clear: Armenia must use all possible diplomatic efforts to ensure that the international community formally recognizes that this trial is not legitimate. It is impossible to expect a fair trial for Armenians in Baku. The statements currently being made by international partners mostly follow the logic that they demand Azerbaijan to ensure a fair trial. However, a fair trial is impossible due to objective reasons, considering the systematic hatred towards Armenians in Azerbaijan. In fact, even Azerbaijani citizens facing political persecution cannot expect a fair trial.
Over the last two to three years, Armenia has accumulated significant political capital, especially in its relations with various European countries, which it should use to secure concrete statements from different actors. Both European institutions and individual states should condemn the trial instead of merely calling for a fair process. At this stage, this is the minimum that Armenia must achieve.
There are already some initial signs of this. A few days ago, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk called on Azerbaijan to immediately release all Armenian prisoners held in Baku. We need to hear such statements more frequently and from more influential figures. If this trial reaches its logical conclusion and Azerbaijan uses the testimonies given there to claim that Armenia carried out various operations, this will not only create legal grounds for Azerbaijan to launch processes against Armenia but also provide political justification.
Tigran, there have been reports in the media that the Azerbaijani government is threatening and planning to close several UN offices and the International Committee of the Red Cross office. How dangerous is this, and can we assume that the trials in Baku will soon become closed, with no public photos or videos about the prisoners' condition?
Yes, of course, if such a decision is made, obtaining any objective information about the condition of Armenian prisoners will become much more difficult. In the case of the Red Cross, this might even be a form of blackmail: if they make inconvenient statements, Azerbaijan might proceed with shutting them down.
We remember that Azerbaijan used similar tactics in Nagorno-Karabakh. At one point, even the Red Cross—a highly neutral organization that rarely makes explicit statements—had to issue a statement saying that Azerbaijan was obstructing the delivery of humanitarian aid to Nagorno-Karabakh. By the way, that statement is now being cited as proof of the Red Cross’s supposed lack of neutrality.
So yes, if they go down this path, it will create serious problems, primarily for the prisoners. But more broadly, Azerbaijan seems to be leveraging current trends in international relations, particularly the statements from the new U.S. administration about the diminishing importance of international organizations.
I remind our viewers that similar discussions are currently taking place in the U.S. as well. For example, officials linked to the Trump administration are talking about the possibility of the U.S. leaving the UN. Aliyev is skillfully exploiting these sentiments to advance his own goals. We already know that, taking advantage of tensions with Russia, Azerbaijan has managed to shut down several Western media outlets operating in the country.
Overall, Azerbaijan’s approach to these issues is indicative of its broader foreign policy over the last few years. By balancing between different power centers and exploiting their contradictions, Baku is achieving its optimal objectives. So these statements about international organizations should be seen as part of Azerbaijan’s broader strategy to further entrench impunity within the country.
Thank you, Tigran.
Thank you as well.